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PSYCHIATRIC RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION:
RESISTING LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Stacey A. Tovino, J.D., Ph.D.∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of restraint1 and seclusion2 in the American
psychiatric setting has a rich history—rich in medical,
ethical, legal, and social controversy.3 For centuries, mental
∗

Assistant Professor of Law, Health Law Institute, Hamline University School
of Law. I am grateful to Bill Winslade, Chester Burns, Marissa Gostanian,
Julie Kutac, Krisann Muskievicz, Susan Night, Cindy Jesson, Michael
Scherschligt, and Carol Swanson for their comments on earlier versions and
presentations of this Article, Bill Winslade and Michael Scherschligt for their
mentorship, Michael Bronson and Claire Duncan for their research assistance,
and Regina Watson and Barb Kallusky at the Hamline Law Library for their
assistance with locating primary sources.
1. Governmental and legal definitions of restraint vary. The Government
Accountability Office defines a restraint as a “partial or total immobilization of
a person through the use of drugs, mechanical devices such as leather cuffs, or
physical holding by another person.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MENTAL
HEALTH: IMPROPER RESTRAINT OR SECLUSION USE PLACES PEOPLE AT RISK,
GAO/HEHS-99-176, at 1 n.1 (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Federal
regulations that apply to Medicare-participating hospitals define restraint as
follows:
Any manual method, physical or mechanical device, material, or
equipment that immobilizes or reduces the ability of a patient to move
his or her harms, legs, body, or head freely; or [a] drug or medication
when it is used as a restriction to manage the patient’s behavior or
restrict the patient’s freedom of movement and is not a standard
treatment or dosage for the patient’s condition.
42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(e)(1)(i)(A)-(B) (2007).
2. Federal regulations that apply to Medicare-participating hospitals
define seclusion as the “involuntary confinement of a patient alone in a room or
area from which the patient is physically prevented from leaving.” 42 C.F.R. §
482.13(e)(1)(ii).
3. See, e.g., John Julian Allen, Seclusion and Restraint of Children: A
Literature Review, 13 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 159, 159
(2000) (“There is widespread concern and ethical debate about the use of these
controversial, untested, and questionably effective interventions . . . .”); Nancy
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health care providers used movement restrictions and solitary
confinement
to
manage
psychiatric
patients.4
Superintendents of eighteenth and early nineteenth century
insane asylums and other institutions of confinement believed
that strait-waistcoats, “tranquilizer chairs,” “maniac beds,”
chains, shackles, and “quiet rooms” deescalated agitation and
promoted self-control.5 Reforms beginning in the nineteenth
century helped make some psychiatric institutions more

S. Cotton, The Developmental-Clinical Rationale for the Use of Seclusion in the
Psychiatric Treatment of Children, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 442, 442 (1989)
(“Ethically, [seclusion] seems to run counter to our humanistic intuitions about
. . . proper treatment . . . . Legally, it poses a serious challenge to the most basic
tenets of our system, focused as it is on the protection of rights and freedom. If
the practice of seclusion is to be justified, one would expect that justification to
come from clinicians, those who prescribe its implementation. Yet even in this
realm many are troubled; the practice of seclusion in our profession of seclusion
seems to e an anomaly in our profession of care and protection.”); J. Carole
Taxis, Ethics and Praxis: Alternative Strategies to Physical Restraint and
Seclusion in a Psychiatric Setting, 23 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 157,
158 (2002) (“An ethical quagmire often arises when the nurse, faced with a
decision to seclude or restrain a patient, must balance factors of autonomy,
beneficence, and nonmaleficence with therapeutic goals.” (citing ELISE
BANDMAN & BERTRAM BANDMAN, NURSING ETHICS THROUGH THE LIFE SPAN
(4th ed. 2001); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2001))).
4. See, e.g., David Macbride, A Methodical Introduction to the Theory and
Practice of Physick, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF PSYCHIATRY, 1535-1860: A
HISTORY PRESENTED IN SELECTED ENGLISH TEXTS 449, 449-50 fig. 90 (Richard
Hunter & Ida Macalpine eds., 1963) [hereinafter THREE HUNDRED YEARS]
(illustrating the straight-waistcoats and “maniac beds” used to restrain patients
in eighteenth-century England).
5. John Haslam, Observations on Madness and Melancholy, in THREE
HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 633, 635 (“In the most violent state of the
disease, the patient should be kept alone in a dark and quiet room so that he
may not be affected by the stimuli of light or sound, such abstraction more
readily disposing to sleep.”); Macbride, supra note 4, at 449-50; Benjamin Rush,
Medical Inquiries and Observations, Upon the Diseases of the Mind, in THREE
HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 662, 668, 671 (illustrating Rush’s
“tranquilizer” chair); Thomas Willis, Two Discourses Concerning the Soul of
Brutes Which Is That of the Vital and Sensitive of Man, in THREE HUNDRED
YEARS, supra note 4, at 188, 191 (“For by this means, the Corporeal Soul being
in some measure depressed and restrained, is compell’d to remit its pride and
fierceness; and so afterwards by degrees grows more mild, and returns in order:
Wherefore, Furious Mad-men are sooner, and more certainly cured by
punishments, and hard usage, in a strait room, than by Physick or Medicines.”).
See generally Nancy Tomes, The Great Restraint Controversy: A Comparative
Perspective on Anglo-American Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century, in 3 THE
ANATOMY OF MADNESS: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY 190, 202-03
(Roy Porter et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the early American belief in the
therapeutic use of restraints).
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humane, in part because staff members were trained to find
ways to calm potentially violent patients without imposing
With the advent of Freud’s
holds or isolation.6
psychoanalysis, advances in microbiology in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the
explosion of psychotropic drugs in the latter half of the
twentieth century, many traditional uses of restraint and
seclusion became unnecessary.7
Federal and state
legislatures and administrative agencies responded to these
philosophical, scientific, and medical developments by
restricting restraint and seclusion to emergency situations
and forbidding their imposition as a means of coercion,
discipline, or convenience.8
Although restraint and seclusion are used less frequently
in the twenty-first century, they persist as methods of
behavior management.9 A number of recent injuries and
deaths associated with these interventions have refueled the

6. Cece Lentini, Fight Against Restraints Goes to Capitol Hill, KEY, Spring
1999, at 1, 8 (“To be sure, reforms that began in the 19th century have helped
make psychiatric institutions much more humane than they once were. With
appropriate training, staff members often can find ways to deescalate a
potentially violent situation without using restraints at all.”); Philippe Pinel, A
Treatise on Insanity, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 602, 606
(examining mid-nineteenth century efforts to abandon coercive and repressive
measures in insane asylums).
7. See generally FRANZ G. ALEXANDER & SHELDON T. SELESNICK, THE
HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: AN EVALUATION OF PSYCHIATRIC THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE FROM PREHISTORIC TIMES TO THE PRESENT 181-210, 271-96 (1966)
(examining the impact of Freud, microbiology, and psychopharmacology on
psychiatry).
8. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
9. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Mental Health, Seclusion and Restraint Data:
State
Hospitals
and
Psychiatric
Programs
(Jan.
2007),
http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/Statehospitals/S&R/default.asp (follow “S/R Data”
hyperlink; then follow “Number of Seclusion Episodes” and “Number of
Restraint Episodes” hyperlinks in “(Click on Image to Open Report)” column of
“Seclusion and Restraints Data Charts” table) (documenting the occurrence of
1546 restraint episodes and 541 seclusion episodes in California state mental
hospitals and correctional facility psychiatric programs between January and
March 2006); G. Kullgren et al., Practices and Attitudes Among Swedish
Psychiatrists Regarding the Ethics of Compulsory Treatment, 16 MED. & L. 499,
501-04 (1997) (examining the extent to which psychiatrists recommend
compulsory interventions, including restraint and seclusion, in various clinical
situations; finding that sixty-one percent of the respondents order restraint in
cases of threatening and violent paranoid psychosis and that seventy-six
percent of the respondents believed that physically restraining out-of-control
patients is ethical).
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dialogue regarding their appropriate use, bringing centuriesold questions to the fore.10 Some stakeholders, who believe
that the use of restraint and seclusion are evidence of patient
warehousing, institutional abuse and neglect, and human
rights violations, support legislation that would further
reduce restraint and seclusion use or eliminate it altogether.11
Other stakeholders, who believe that restraint and seclusion
can be used to prevent violent or assaultive patients from
harming themselves and others, are questioning the scientific
basis, cost, and feasibility of restraint-and-seclusion-free
initiatives.12 In recent legislative sessions, federal and state
10. See, e.g., Walter Goodman, Restraint as a Euphemism in Psychiatric
Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at E8 (reviewing a 60 Minutes II segment
that covered the story of a sixteen-year-old boy who was asphyxiated by a towel
while he was being “therapeutically restrained” at a for-profit psychiatric
hospital); Hospital and Employees Cited in Death of Child, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
1998, at B5 (reporting the death of an eleven-year-old boy who suffocated while
being restrained at a Connecticut psychiatric facility); JOINT COMM’N ON
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., THE JOINT COMMISSION’S SENTINEL
EVENT DATABASE: 10 YEARS OF DIGGING AT THE ROOTS 3 (2005) (identifying 124
deaths of restrained patients from data collected from 1995 to 2004); Tina
Kelley, Center for Disabled Children Agrees to Improve Medical Care, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2005, at B2 (discussing the 2002 death of fourteen-year-old
Matthew Goodman after he was restrained at a center for developmentally
disabled children); Encarnacion Pyle, Reformers Push to End Restraint,
Seclusion; Death, Injuries Prompt Training of Workers in More Positive
Methods, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 2005, at A15 (reporting additional
restraint and seclusion deaths); Heather Vogell, Safer Restraints in Group
Homes? Proposed Rules Would Ban Workers from Sitting on Children, KATHI’S
MENTAL
HEALTH
REV.,
Apr.
28,
2005,
at
http://www.toddlertime.com/advocacy/hospitals/restraints/restraints-0514052.htm (reporting the deaths of a twelve-year-old girl and a nine-year-old boy
after mental health care workers laid on the children to restrain them).
11. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS.,
POSITION STATEMENT ON SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT (1999) [hereinafter
POSITION STATEMENT] (“It is NASMHPD’s goal to prevent, reduce, and
ultimately eliminate the use of seclusion and restraint . . . .”); SUBSTANCE
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., A NATIONAL CALL TO ACTION: ELIMINATING THE USE OF SECLUSION AND
RESTRAINT 5 (2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL CALL] (“It is now a priority for
SAMHSA to . . . ultimately eliminate the use of seclusion and restraint. . . .
Research shows that physical force, mobilization, and isolation are
dehumanizing. Seclusion and restraint . . . risk lives and inflict emotional and
physical trauma.”); Janice LeBel & Kevin Ann Huckshorn, Elimination of
Seclusion and Restraint: A Reasonable Goal?, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 576, 577
(2006) (“The assertion that seclusion and restraint can ultimately be eliminated
. . . stands squarely on its own merits.”); cf. Akihito Suzuki, The Politics and
Ideology of Non-Restraint: The Case of the Hanwell Asylum, 39 MED. HIST. 1
(1995) (examining the non-restraint movement of Victorian psychiatry).
12. See, e.g., News Release, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Guiding Principles on
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lawmakers have attempted to respond to these seemingly
irreconcilable concerns.13 Many commentators believe that
heightened awareness of inappropriate restraint and
seclusion practices and more intense education and
regulation will resolve these concerns.14 I argue instead that

Restraint and Seclusion for Behavioral Health Services, Feb. 29, 1999, at
http://www.naphs.org/news/guidingprinc.html (arguing that “[r]estraint and
seclusion, when used properly, can be life-saving and injury-sparing
interventions,” and that overregulation of restraint and seclusion policies “could
divert limited resources to bureaucratic activities” when such monies should be
dedicated to clinical care); Andrés Martin et al., Letter to the Editor, Seclusion
and Restraint “One-Hour Rule,” 43 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 1322, 1322 (2004) (stating that particular restraint and seclusion
regulations “strain available human resources,” are “logistically burdensome,”
and “may be of limited clinical utility”).
13. Compare Child and Adolescent Mental Health Resiliency Act of 2006, S.
3449, 109th Cong. § 110 (2006) (proposing the development and dissemination
of educational materials that would encourage ending the use of restraint and
seclusion in all facilities or programs that care for children and adolescents, as
well as the training of mental health professionals and others on alternatives to
restraint and seclusion), and 104 MASS. CODE REGS. 27.12(1) (2006) (requiring
private, county, and municipal mental health facilities in Massachusetts to
develop a plan to eliminate, wherever possible, the use of restraint and
seclusion), and S.B. 325, 75th Leg., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 698 (requiring state
administrative agencies to adopt rules defining acceptable restraint holds,
governing the use of seclusion, and developing methods for lowering the
frequency of restraint and seclusion practices), with 70 Fed. Reg. 67,093, 67,093
(Nov. 4, 2005) (clarifying that any authorized licensed health care professional
may order the use of restraint and seclusion when necessary), and A. 9986,
2006 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006) (proposing that New York physician assistants and
nurse practitioners be permitted to order restraint), and S. 683, 2005 Leg.,
116th Sess. (S.C. 2005-2006) (proposing that South Carolina licensed
independent practitioners be permitted to order restraint).
14. See, e.g., Joyce Jorgenson & Carol Geisler, Education Is Key to SystemWide Change, NETWORKS, Summer/Fall 2002, at 9, 9 (“Education . . . is a
cornerstone to changing the cultural environment that tolerates the practice of
restraints and seclusion.”); NAT’L ASS’N OF PSYCHIATRIC HEALTH SYS., GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES
1 (1999) (recommending the sharing of guidelines and information on
inappropriate restraint and seclusion techniques); Eric M. Weiss, Hundreds of
the Nation’s Most Vulnerable Have Been Killed by the System Intended to Care
for Them, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Oct. 11, 1998, at A1, available at
http://www.pcma.com/crisis_intervention_news/deadly_restraint/day1.stm (part
of the newspaper’s five-part investigative series “Deadly Restraint: A
Nationwide Pattern of Death,” published October 11-15, 1998) (“Yet the great
tragedy is that many of the deaths could have been prevented by setting
standards that are neither costly nor difficult: better training in restraint use;
constant or frequent monitoring of patients in restraints; the banning of
dangerous techniques such as face-down floor holds; CPR training for all directcare workers.”).
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the psychiatric15 restraint and seclusion controversy16 resists
legislative solution because it is a function of more
fundamental problems relating to mental health care access
and finance. The controversy persists because of these
practical problems, and because the use of restraint and
seclusion implicate seemingly competing goals of patient
safety and individual autonomy and, more broadly, the
philosophical doctrines of legalism and medicalism.
Future restraint and seclusion policy must continue to
address the significant dangers associated with these
interventions by requiring the use of alternative de-escalation
strategies, less restrictive measures consistent with patient
and ward safety, and advanced monitoring of restrained and
secluded patients. Our health care policy also must address
the root causes of restraint and seclusion use. By providing
earlier intervention and care for individuals with mental
illness, we can reduce the incidence of violent and aggressive
behavior that traditionally precedes restraint and seclusion.
We also must recognize the liberty interferences and
psychological injuries that are associated with the use of
restraint and seclusion and should incorporate within each
restrained or secluded patient’s plan of care measures to
respond to such interferences and injuries.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II provides an
abbreviated American history of care for mental illness and a
contextual framework for understanding current restraint
and seclusion use. Part II places today’s restraint and
seclusion controversy in its proper historical context. Part III

15. This Article examines the use of restraint and seclusion in the
psychiatric context. Outside the scope of this Article is the use of restraint and
seclusion with other populations, including individuals with intellectual and
developmental disabilities and individuals that require acute-level medical and
surgical care.
16. Historians, clinicians, policymakers, and others refer to recurring
questions regarding the appropriateness of restraint and seclusion use as the
“restraint controversy.” See, e.g., Joseph K. Mullen, The Physical Restraint
Controversy, 9 RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 92, 92 (2000); Tomes, supra note 5
(examining “The Great Restraint Controversy”); Dave Ziegler, Is There a
Therapeutic Value to Physical Restraint?, CHILD. VOICE, July/Aug. 2004,
available at http://www.cwla.org/articles/cv0407myturn.htm (“This exposé of
injuries and deaths reported caused by the use of restraint and seclusion is
often credited with starting the current wave of criticism of restraint and
seclusion. The controversy has run the gambit from media coverage to policy
change and new federal legislation.”).
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carefully examines the scientific literature supporting and
opposing the use of psychiatric restraint and seclusion. This
section compares late twentieth century studies that conclude
that restraint and seclusion have a wide range of accepted
and appropriate uses to recent “survivor” studies and sentinel
event data, which link these interventions to increased
patient agitation, injury, and death. By providing a balanced
review of the relevant medical literature and available data,
Part III attempts to dispose of one-sided arguments about
restraint and seclusion and encourages a more complete
dialogue regarding the criteria (if any) that justify their use.
Part IV examines federal and state efforts to regulate the
use of restraint and seclusion in the psychiatric context. This
section shows how lawmakers struggle to establish
appropriate restraint and seclusion boundaries hundreds of
years after the introduction of these interventions as methods
of behavior management.
Part V places the restraint and seclusion controversy
within the broader context of the mental health care system.
Americans generally do not have a constitutional, statutory,
or common law right to voluntary, non-emergency mental
health care and available care is under-funded.17 The lack of
access to, and funding for, basic mental health care
contributes to emergency, inpatient, and acute mental health
care, contexts in which restraint and seclusion are used more
frequently.18 Although federal and state laws prohibit the use
of restraint and seclusion as a substitute for adequate
staffing, these mandates are unfunded.19 While the current
restraint and seclusion discourse correctly considers the
interventions’ significant risks and liberty interferences, it
fails to give proper weight to their role in preventing violence
and patient self-injury in psychiatric emergencies that result
from unstabilized psychiatric conditions and a lack of access
to mental health care, not a lack of training regarding
alternative de-escalation strategies.
I thus recommend the following approach. In addition to
requiring the use of alternative de-escalation strategies if the
benefits of those strategies outweigh the physical and

17. See discussion infra Part V.A.
18. See discussion infra Part V.A.
19. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-C.
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psychological risks posed by restraint and seclusion to the
patient and third parties, my approach would: (1) address the
root causes of the use of restraint and seclusion; (2) require
health care providers who use restraint and seclusion to use
the safest techniques and the most advanced methods of
patient monitoring; and (3) require health care providers who
use restraint and seclusion to acknowledge the liberty
interferences and psychological injuries that result from these
interventions and incorporate within each restrained or
secluded patient’s plan of care measures to respond to such
interferences and injuries. I conclude that the current nonrestraint movement has important and laudable goals;
however, lawmakers need to consider a more complete
dialogue regarding the root causes, implementation, and
effects of these interventions before adopting blanket
elimination policies.
II. CARE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS: A BRIEF AMERICAN HISTORY
Mental illness posed few significant problems for
American communities before 1800.20 One theory is that the
settlers of the English colonies did not encourage individuals
with mental illness to join them on the Atlantic passage.21 A
second theory relates to demographics.
The colonist
population was relatively scattered, and no urban area had
more than 50,000 residents, and only two areas had 25,000 or
more residents as late as 1790.22 The number of mentally ill
A study of the
colonists was correspondingly small.23
frequency of mental abnormality, including insanity, in the
official records of the British American and Caribbean
colonies from 1607 to 1700 identified eighty-two cases of
mental abnormality among a total population of
approximately 300,000.24 The study concluded that mental
illness was not widespread in the early colonies.25
20. Gerald N. Grob, The Severely and Chronically Mentally Ill in America:
Retrospect and Prospect, in SICKNESS & HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE
HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 334, 335 (Judith Walzer Leavitt &
Ronald L. Numbers eds., 3rd rev. ed., 1997).
21. E. FULLER TORREY & JUDY MILLER, THE INVISIBLE PLAGUE: THE RISE
OF MENTAL ILLNESS FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 193 (2001).
22. Grob, supra note 20, at 335.
23. Id.
24. TORREY & MILLER, supra note 21, at 194.
25. Id.

TOVINO FINAL

8/8/2007 11:12:33 AM

2007] PSYCHIATRIC RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION

519

Until the late nineteenth century, the only recognized
form of mental illness was “insanity,” loosely defined as a
condition in which an individual is “unable to function in
society because of delusions, hallucinations, incoherent
speech, paranoia, depression, or withdrawal from social
relationships.”26 The colonists believed that the cause of
insanity rested with God and could not be eliminated.27 The
result was that the biological and social sources of insanity
received little attention during the colonial period.28 Noninstitutional methods for responding to insanity seemed
appropriate, and the colonists generally left the insane in the
care of their families and supported them, in case of need, as
one of the poor.29 Poorhouses, almshouses, and even prisons
provided institutional support when necessary.30
Family, poorhouse, and almshouse support gave way to
hospitals and insane asylums in the late eighteenth century.31
The first American’ hospitals, the Pennsylvania Hospital
(1751) and the New York Hospital (1791), had as a primary
goal the care of the insane.32 At first, the Pennsylvania
Hospital provided care to the insane in the basement of its
main building.33 In 1841, the hospital opened a new building
26. William G. Rothstein, A Historical Analysis of the Treatment of the
Mentally Ill, in READINGS IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT ISSUES IN
SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 281, 281 (William G. Rothstein ed., 1995).
27. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 109 (1971).
28. Id.
29. Grob, supra note 20, at 335; ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xiii; EDWARD
SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO THE
AGE OF PROZAC 49 (1997); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE 72 (1949); TORREY & MILLER, supra note 21, at 194.
30. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xiii-xix.
31. Andrew Scull, The Discovery of the Asylum Revisited: Lunacy Reform in
the New American Republic, in MADHOUSES, MAD-DOCTORS, AND MADMEN: THE
SOCIAL HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE VICTORIAN ERA 144, 145 (Andrew Scull
ed., 1981) [hereinafter MADHOUSES]. But see MENTAL HYGIENE TASK FORCE,
N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, AN EVALUATION OF THE DELIVERY OF MENTAL HYGIENE
SERVICES
IN
NEW
YORK
STATE
8
(2005),
available
at
http://www.assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Mental/20050303/ (noting that New
York State permitted the confinement of individuals with mental illness in jails
and poorhouses until the late nineteenth century).
32. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF
AMERICA’S HOSPITAL SYSTEM 33 (1987); Morris J. Vogel, The Transformation of
the American Hospital, in INSTITUTIONS OF CONFINEMENT: HOSPITALS,
ASYLUMS, AND PRISONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 1500-1950,
at 39, 41 (Norbert Finzsch & Robert Jutte eds., 1996).
33. Scull, supra note 31, at 145.
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that was designed exclusively for the care of the insane.34
The New York Hospital housed its “maniacs” first in the
basement and then in a new third story35 until 1808, when a
separate building for the insane was constructed on the
hospital’s grounds.36 This separate building, which later
moved to a different part of the city, became known as the
Bloomington Asylum.37
The first American hospital devoted exclusively to the
care and cure of the insane opened in Williamsburg, Virginia,
in 1773.38 Williamsburg’s “Public Hospital for Persons of
Insane and Disordered Minds”39 was the only facility of its
kind until 1824, when the state of Kentucky established its
Eastern Lunatic Asylum.40 By 1861, forty-eight asylums had
been established in the United States, including thirty-two
public asylums in twenty-five states, one federal asylum for
the District of Columbia, and fifteen small private asylums
devoted to paying patients.41 By 1880, approximately eighty
public institutions for the mentally ill existed in the United
States.42 By 1920, approximately 521 mental hospitals had
been established.43 Known as the “age of the asylum,” some
historians interpret this period as one of medical reform.44
Others believe that mental illness was socially, and not just
medically, constructed,45 and that the insane asylum was an
attempt to restore a necessary social balance to the new

34. ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 33.
35. Scull, supra note 31, at 146.
36. ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 33-34.
37. Id. at 34.
38. SHORTER, supra note 29, at 45.
39. Colonial
Williamsburg,
Public
Hospital,
http://www.history.org/Almanack/places/hb/hbhos.cfm (last visited Feb. 25,
2007).
40. EDWARD B. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 4 (1984).
41. Rothstein, supra note 26, at 282; see also Grob, supra note 20, at 335
(“[B]y the Civil War, almost every state had established one or more public
institutions for [the mentally ill].”).
42. BARBARA SICHERMAN, THE QUEST FOR MENTAL HEALTH IN AMERICA:
1880-1917, at 13-14 (1980).
43. STARR, supra note 29, at 169.
44. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xiv (coining the period “age of the asylum”);
see also Clive Unsworth, Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry’s ‘Golden Age,’ 13
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 479, 481 (1993) (“With the arrival of the carceral era, .
. . . [a] new system combined an extensive network of lunatic asylums, public
and private, in which patients were legally detained . . . .”).
45. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xv.
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republic.46
A. Physical Care
At the time of the opening of the Williamsburg facility,
mental illness was considered a disease of the brain and the
nervous system, and individuals who were mentally ill were
treated as though they chose to be irrational.47 Treatments
were primarily physical and medical, and consisted of
seclusion, mechanical and medicinal restraints, plunge baths
and other “shock” water treatments, bleeding, and blistering
salves.48 By modern standards these treatments undoubtedly
seem cruel.
But at a time when the mysteries of
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and
agitation had yet to be unlocked, these treatments were
considered humane. Seclusion, or the solitary confinement of
individuals in “quiet rooms,” was believed to be particularly
effective in calming severely agitated individuals.49 In 1799,
two dungeon-like cells were dug under the first floor of the
Williamsburg facility.50 Patients who experienced “state[s] of
raving phrenzy”51 were involuntarily maintained in the dark
and gloomy52 cells for hours, days,53 months,54 years55 and,
sometimes, on a permanent basis.56
46. Id. at xviii.
47. Colonial Williamsburg, supra note 39.
48. Id.
49. See Cotton, supra note 3, at 443-44 (discussing the use of quiet rooms).
50. Colonial Williamsburg, supra note 39.
51. Id.
52. ROBERT WALN, JR., AN ACCOUNT OF THE ASYLUM FOR THE INSANE 3, 6
(Phila.,
Benjamin
&
Thomas
Kite,
1825),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/bookres.fcgi/history/pdf_waln.pdf (describing
the dark and gloomy solitary confinement chambers at Philadelphia’s Friends
Asylum in 1825).
53. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (reporting the seclusion of a
Missouri man for thirty days in 1999).
54. WALN, supra note 52, at 23-24 (reporting the eighteen-month seclusion
of a patient at Philadelphia’s Friends Asylum in the first quarter of the
nineteenth century).
55. Elizabeth Stawicki, A Haunting Legacy: Canton Insane Asylum for
American Indians (Minnesota Public Radio broadcast Dec. 9, 1997) (audio and
transcript
available
at
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/199712/09_stawickie_asylum/)
(reporting the three-year seclusion of a patient at South Dakota’s Canton
Insane Asylum).
56. WALN, supra note 52, at 24 (reporting the “permanent” seclusion of a
Friends Asylum patient).
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Mechanical restraints, including straitjackets, muffs, leglocks, handcuffs, and “coercion chairs,” were also popular.57
These mechanisms were believed to help agitated patients
regain their self-control.58 Straitjackets (cloth or canvas coats
that crossed patients’ hands or arms in front of their bodies
and secured them to the opposite sides) were believed to be
particularly humane, and far gentler than the shackles and
chains used in prisons.59 Straitjackets applied no weighted
pressure to the arms or body, caused fewer skin abrasions,
and allowed some form of movement.60
Benjamin Rush, the father of American psychiatry,
developed in 1811 his famous “tranquilizer chair,” considered
by some to be the most complete human restraint ever
devised.61 The tranquilizer chair featured a wooden chair
with an adjustable backboard.62 At the top of the backboard
was a wooden box lined with stuffed linen that secured the
patient’s head and prevented it from moving from side to
side.63 Chest, belly, arm, and hand bands, made of flat pieces
of strong leather, limited movement, and wood ankle
bracelets confined the feet.64 To the underside of the chair
was fastened a half water-filled stool pan that could be
emptied and replaced without disturbing the patient. The
legs of the chair were fastened to the floor.65 Some patients
reportedly were strapped to tranquilizer chairs for as long as
six months.66
B. Moral Treatment
Less physical methods of treating insanity grew in
popularity after the American Revolution, in part because of
the influential writings of Philippe Pinel in France and
57. See JOHN CONOLLY, THE TREATMENT OF THE INSANE WITHOUT
MECHANICAL RESTRAINTS (Arno Press 1973) (1866).
58. Kansas
State
Historical
Society,
Straitjacket,
http://www.kshs.org/cool3/straitjacket.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Rush, supra note 5, at 671, fig.134.
62. Id. at 671.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Legends of Am., Glore Psychiatric Museum in St. Joseph, MO,
http://www.legendsofamerica.com/MO-PsychiatricMuseum2.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2007).
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Samuel Tuke in England.67 Pinel and Tuke insisted that kind
and gentle treatment, known as “moral treatment,” could
cure insanity.68 Moral treatment was based on the idea that a
beautiful location and an appropriate social and physical
environment could have curative powers.69 American insane
asylums in the mid-nineteenth century adopted the
philosophy of moral treatment and emphasized kindness over
coercion.70 The daily routine of patients treated in accordance
with this philosophy included occupational therapy, religious
exercises, “amusements,” “games,”71 and plenty of rest in cells
furnished with beds and other comforts.72 T. Romeyn Beck, a
New York physician, explained the trend towards moral
treatment: “Coercion by blows, stripes and chains, although
sanctioned by the authority of Celsus and Cullen, is now
justly laid aside . . . .”73
Consistent with the philosophy of moral treatment, in
1851 the Association of Medical Superintendents of American
Institutions for the Insane (AMSAII), the predecessor of the
American Psychiatric Association, adopted twenty-six
standards (Standards) relating to the location and
construction of asylums.74 The Standards required insane
asylums to be “located in the country, not within less than
two miles of a large town, and easily accessible at all
67. Robert Gardiner Hill, A Lecture on the Management of Lunatic Asylums,
and the Treatment of the Insane, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at
886, 887. See generally Pinel, supra note 6, at 602-13 (discussing the pioneering
work of Pinel); Samuel Tuke, The Retreat: An Institution in New York, in THREE
HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 684, 684-90 (discussing the work of Tuke).
68. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at 109-10; Rothstein, supra note 26, at 281.
69. See, e.g., SICHERMAN, supra note 42, at 15; Grob, supra note 20, at 336
(“There were to be no threats of physical violence; and only rarely were
mechanical means of restraint to be employed.”); Note, Liability of Mental
Hospitals for Acts of Their Patients Under the Open Door Policy, 57 VA. L. REV.
156, 158 (1971) (discussing the tolerating and accepting attitudes that
characterized the moral treatment philosophy); Rothstein, supra note 26, at
281-82 (“Moral treatment consisted of a morally and religiously uplifting
environment and care by compassionate attendants who treated the patients
with persuasion and sympathy rather than coercion, although restraint was
employed when necessary.”).
70. See, e.g., SICHERMAN, supra note 42, at 15.
71. Grob, supra note 20, at 336.
72. Colonial Williamsburg, supra note 39.
73. ALEX BEAM, GRACEFULLY INSANE: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICA’S
PREMIER MENTAL HOSPITAL 11 (2001).
74. SARAH C. SITTON, LIFE AT THE TEXAS STATE LUNATIC ASYLUM: 18571997, at 11 (1999).
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seasons.”75 The Standards also required insane asylums to
devote not less than fifty acres to pleasure gardens for use by
patients.76 The stated reasons for the geographic and garden
requirements were to remove patients from the stress of
urban living while ensuring, through proximity to town, ease
of provisioning and access for visitors.77 Three years after
AMSAII adopted these Standards, Dr. Thomas Kirkbride,
superintendent of the prestigious Pennsylvania Hospital for
the Insane, published his famous linear plan for the
construction of insane asylums.78 The plan, which featured a
central structure with wings on the side, was believed to
contribute to the restoration of sanity.79
C. Custodial Care
The successive philosophies of physical treatment and
moral treatment eventually gave way to custodial care.80
After the middle of the nineteenth century, the asylum
superintendents’ administrative duties overwhelmed their
medical duties.81 As a result, custodial care, also called
patient warehousing, became commonplace.82 The asylums
lacked adequate staff to provide treatment, and asylum
attendants were not properly trained to work with

75. Id. at 12.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at 134; SITTON, supra note 75, at 4; Kenneth
D. Gaver, Mental Illness and Mental Retardation: The History of State Care in
Texas, IMPACT, July/Aug. 1975, at 5. Although Kirkbride and his followers
believed that the structure of the asylum contributed to mental health, others
believe that the imposing structure of the asylum was needed to convince the
public of the importance of the emerging specialty of psychiatry. See, e.g.,
Nancy J. Tomes, A Generous Confidence: Thomas Story Kirkbride’s Philosophy
of Asylum Construction and Management, in MADHOUSES, supra note 31, at
121, 123 (“In the campaign to promote the asylum and the medical specialty
associated with it, asylum construction and management played a key role. The
hospital’s unique appearance and regimen offered proof to the families of the
afflicted that these doctors were making use of a radical new treatment for a
dreaded ailment. In distinguishing themselves from competitors, the asylum
was by far the most impressive item in the superintendents’ therapeutic
armamentarium. The mental hospital served as their professional showcase,
their most effective public advertisement.”).
79. SITTON, supra note 75, at 4.
80. Rothstein, supra note 26, at 282.
81. Id. at 283.
82. Id.
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individuals who suffered from mental illness.83 Restraints,
which were supposed to be used only occasionally under the
philosophy of moral treatment, were used more frequently to
maintain order.84 Some patients remained in restraints for
days.85
A belated example of patient warehousing involved
Osawatomie State Hospital, which was established in Kansas
in 1866. Osawatomie State Hospital had twelve beds at the
time of its opening.86 By the end of 1867, the Hospital had
twenty-two patients with fifty more desiring admission.87 A
ratio of one physician per 845 patients had developed by
To manage the large patient body, attendants
1945.88
resorted to the use of force with male patients, and
straitjackets and wrist-cuffs with female patients.89 In 1950,
the Kansas City Star published a series of articles on the
conditions at Osawatomie and other state hospitals.
According to these reports, up to one-half of the Osawatomie
patient population was straitjacketed at any given time.90
Documentation shows that Osawatomie State Hospital
continued to straitjacket its patients until at least 1956.91
D. Community Care
By the late nineteenth century, the majority view was
that insane asylums did not cure mental illness.92 Pliny
Earle, psychiatrist and co-founder of the American Medical
Association, documented his belief as early as 1887 that
asylum superintendents had greatly exaggerated their earlier
recovery rates, thus contributing to the cult of curability.93
This changing perspective resulted in a reexamination of the
methods of treating mental illness.94 In 1880, one group of

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
(1887).
94.

Kansas State Historical Society, supra note 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kansas State Historical Society, supra note 58.
Id.
Id.
SICHERMAN, supra note 42, at 12.
PLINY EARLE, THE CURABILITY OF INSANITY 22 (Arno Press Inc. 1972)
SICHERMAN, supra note 42, at 12.
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psychiatrists, neurologists, and lay individuals who believed
that the then-current system of providing mental health care
was deficient organized the National Association for the
Protection of the Insane and the Prevention of Insanity
(NAPIPI).95 The primary purpose of NAPIPI was to improve
conditions within insane asylums and to reverse the growing
trend of insanity through preventive treatment.96
At the turn of the century, insane asylums began to lose
their centrality and identity as the best means of treating
insanity.97 As America became more industrialized, new
outpatient centers began to replace the asylum as a means for
dealing with mental health conditions.98 At the same time,
the concept of mental illness began to expand due, in part, to
World War I and the mental hygiene movement.99 World War
I transformed views of mental illness from a “vague
abstraction into a meaningful illness” as soldiers suffered
from “shell shock” and “war neurosis.”100 In addition, the
science of promoting mental health and preventing mental
illness through the application of psychiatry and psychology
emerged in part as a result of Clifford W. Beers’s 1908
autobiography, A Mind That Found Itself, which described his
experiences in institutions for the insane.101 Using the phrase
“mental hygiene” to describe his ideas,102 Beers founded the
Connecticut Society for Mental Hygiene (1908) and the
National Committee for Mental Hygiene (1909).103 The goals
of both groups were to improve the quality of care for the
mentally ill, to prevent mental illness when possible, and to
ensure the availability of accurate information relating to
mental health.104
By the 1940s, few individuals believed that the
95. Id.
96. Id. at 12-13.
97. See ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xvi-xvii (stating that “new methods
replaced the asylum for dealing with social problems”).
98. Id.
99. Rothstein, supra note 26, at 284-85.
100. Id.
101. See generally MIRIAM SIEGLER & HUMPHRY OSMOND, MODELS OF
MADNESS, MODELS OF MEDICINE 147 (1974) (discussing Beers’ contributions to
the community mental health movement).
102. Id.
103. See
Clifford
Beers
Found.
Home
Page,
http://www.cliffordbeersfoundation.co.uk/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
104. Rothstein, supra note 26, at 284-85.
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structured environment of the asylum could cure mental
Some individuals even doubted the custodial
illness.105
benefit of the asylum.106 The national census of mental
hospitals declined from a peak of 634,000 in 1954 to 579,000
in 1963.107 One prominent, though contested, explanation for
the census drop was the discovery of psychopharmacology,108
including medicinal tranquilizers, neuroleptics, and
antidepressants. Under this theory, “patients who were
previously hospitalized ‘could now be safely treated, or at
least more safely ignored,’ on an outpatient basis.”109 Another
explanation for the decline in number of mental hospitals lies
in Congress’ 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act,
which provided greater aid to states to support aged
individuals in nursing homes.110 By transferring patients
from mental hospitals to nursing homes, states could obtain
more reimbursement from the federal government.111 A final
explanation was provided by the new “community psychiatry”
advocates, who argued that “state hospitals reinforced
disability and isolation, [but that] local services and halfway
houses could help return the mentally ill to normal roles in
society.”112
By the mid-1900’s, a combination of forces likely caused
the “near emptying” of state mental hospitals.113 Many
asylum patients were discharged and individuals who would
have been admitted to an asylum in the past were referred to
community centers.114 The initial trends in American mental
health care (physical, moral, and custodial) gave way to the
current philosophy of community mental health care.115 With

105. SITTON, supra note 75, at 132.
106. Id.
107. STARR, supra note 29, at 365.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. SITTON, supra note 75, at 7.
114. Id.
115. Cf. Unsworth, supra note 44, at 479 (dividing the history of the
provision for individuals with mental disorders into three eras: (1) precarceral—“before the mass consignment of the mentally disordered to
specialized institutions had taken place”; (2) carceral—characterized by the
powerful insane asylum; and (3) post-carceral—“encompassing the
transformation in legal relations which has accompanied the attempt to close
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the advent of deinstitutionalization116 and the growth of
community support programs, fewer psychiatric patients are
restrained or secluded for behavior management.117 Many
believe, however, that the “deinstitutionalization of
individuals with less serious illness has resulted in an
inpatient population with more severe mental illness.”118
III. THE CURRENT RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION CONTROVERSY
Although used less frequently in the twenty-first century,
restraint and seclusion persist as methods of behavior
management.119 Current methods of restraint include drugs,
mechanical devices, and physical holding by another
person.120 Drugs fall within the definition of “restraints”
when they are used “to manage the patient’s behavior or
restrict the patient’s freedom of movement and [are] not a
standard treatment for the patient’s condition.”121 They
include sedatives (such as Ativan), antipsychotic drugs (such
as Haldol), and other drugs usually given by injection that
alter mood, mental status, or behavior.122 Mechanical devices
used to restrain patients include two-point restraints (which
immobilize an individual’s hands using a nylon, cotton, furlined, quilted, or leather cuff around each wrist),123 four-point
the asylum and substitute non-institutional alternatives”).
116. See Meredith Karasch, Note, Where Involuntary Commitment, Civil
Liberties, and the Right to Mental Health Care Collide: An Overview of
California’s Mental Illness System, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 493, 495 (2003) (discussing
deinstitutionalization in the mid-twentieth century).
117. Lentini, supra note 6, at 8.
118. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; see also Steven S. Sharfstein, Seclusion
and Restraint, 16 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 1, 1 (1999) (“Deinstitutionalization of the
mentally ill over the last 30 years has created a public health crisis across the
country.”).
119. See generally Kim J. Masters, Modernizing Seclusion and Restraint,
May 28, 2005, at 2 (noting the similarity between current and old methods of
restraint and seclusion: “Very little fundamental change has occurred to
restraint and seclusion devices and monitoring equipment since 1794, when
Philippe Pinel developed humane practices for helping psychiatric patients
manage episodes of violence.”).
120. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 n.l.
121. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(1)(i)(B) (2007).
122. Daniel Watson, The Crazy Shift, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2000, at
68,
69,
available
at
http://psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-20000901000037.html (describing the chemical restraint of an emergent psychiatric
patient using Ativan and Haldol).
123. See,
e.g.,
EMS
Medical
Products,
Posey
Restraints,
http://www.emsmedicalproducts.com/b20.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007)
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restraints (which immobilize a person on a bed or gurney
with a cuff around each wrist and each ankle), and five-point
restraints (which add an additional belt around the waist), as
well as a variety of finger-control mitts, vests, jackets, body
Physical holds
nets, and tightly-tucked sheet wraps.124
usually involve one or more staff members holding a patient’s
arms; or lying across, sitting across, or straddling a patient’s
body while the patient is in a prone (face-down), supine (facePhysical holds traditionally
up), or seated position.125
included “basket holds” (in which the patient’s arms were
crisscrossed over her chest and held from behind while the
patient was eased to the ground) as well as a variety of other
aptly-named holds.126 Modern seclusion usually involves an
involuntary confinement of an individual in a small room or a
single bedroom.127
A. Restraint and Seclusion Perspectives
Perspectives regarding psychiatric restraint and
seclusion vary. One traditional position is that restraint and
seclusion may be used to calm violent and assaultive patients,
teach patients how to control themselves, and preserve the
calm of the psychiatric ward. A second position is that
restraint and seclusion carry significant physical and

(illustrating a variety of wrist and ankle cuffs).
124. See, e.g., Rehabmart Discount Medical Equipment, Restraints,
http://www.rehabmart.com/category/Restraints.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007)
(illustrating a variety of wrist and ankle cuffs, belts, finger-control mitts, vests,
jackets, and body nets).
125. Letter from Wan J. Kim, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable
Rick Perry, Governor of Texas 23-26 (Dec. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/lubbock_sch_findlet_12-11-06.pdf
(describing incidents of physical restraint, including staff members lying on top
of face-down and side-lying residents); David M. Day, A Review of the
Literature on the Effectiveness of Physical Restraints in Children and Youth,
at slide 9 (June 1-4, 2005), available at http://rccp.cornell.edu/pdfs/dday.pdf
(describing the prone and supine holds).
126. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the basket hold);
Rhonda Bodfield, CPS Finds 4 Cases of Abuse at Desert Hills in 5 Years, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, Mar. 4, 1998, at 1A (describing a number of instances in which
physical holds were used to control youths at an Arizona behavioral treatment
facility); David Allen, Risk & Prone Restraint: Reviewing the Evidence, at
http://rccp.cornell.edu/pdfs/allen.pdf#search=%22physical%20holds%20used%20
to%20restrain%20children%22 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (illustrating how
asphyxia can occur during various physical holds).
127. Pyle, supra note 10.
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psychological risks, although they may be used in some
emergency situations. A third position is taken by some
individuals who have survived incidences of restraint and
seclusion, but not without physical or psychological injury.
Called “survivor literature,” these reports emphasize patients’
unfavorable views of their restraint and seclusion
experiences. A fourth position is that psychiatric restraint
and seclusion are inherently dangerous and should be
eliminated. Each of these positions is discussed in more
detail below.
The first position is that restraint and seclusion have a
wide range of accepted and appropriate uses, including
calming violent and assaultive patients, teaching patients
how to control themselves and preserving the psychiatric
ward milieu.128 Support for this traditional position is found
in a number of scientific studies and medical journal articles
published in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. For example,
one study argued that seclusion does obtain desired
behavioral results, including control of violence and reduction
of anxiety.129 Other studies emphasize that restraint and
seclusion are necessary for sustaining the “smooth
functioning” of the ward minisociety and can help agitated
individuals calm themselves.130 Another study justified the
use of restraint and seclusion for patients who, without such
interventions, may have engaged in deliberate self-injury.131
Yet another study firmly concluded that the use of restraint
and seclusion offer therapeutic and control functions for
patients and staff. 132 A final illustrative study concluded

128. See, e.g., Renee L. Binder & Susan M. McCoy, A Study of Patients’
Attitudes Toward Placement in Seclusion, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
1052, 1052 (1983) (“[S]eclusion is an accepted treatment modality on many
psychiatric inpatient units . . . .”); Cotton, supra note 3, at 442 (discussing at
length the psychiatric benefits of seclusion); Harriet Wadeson & William T.
Carpenter, Impact of the Seclusion Room Experience, 163 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 318, 318 (1976) (“The seclusion room is an important, but
ambivalently perceived aspect of psychiatric inpatient units.”).
129. Wadeson & Carpenter, supra note 129, at 318.
130. Donald S. Gair, Limit-Setting and Seclusion in the Psychiatric Hospital,
17 PSYCHIATRIC OPINION 15, 15 (1980); Robert H. Plutchik et al., Toward a
Rationale for the Seclusion Process, 166 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 571,
571 (1978).
131. Kenneth Tardiff, Emergency Control Measures for Psychiatric
Inpatients, 169 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 614, 618 (1981).
132. Paul H. Soloff & Samuel M. Turner, Patterns of Seclusion: A Prospective
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that seclusion is one intervention that “can be effective in
treating . . . impulsive, relationship-resistant children who
have been unable to learn internal control from other
socialization interactions.”133
A second perspective recognizes the value of restraint
and seclusion in some emergency situations, but emphasizes
the significant physical and psychological risks associated
with these interventions. For example, the author of one
review article found that it was “nearly impossible” to operate
a program for severely symptomatic individuals without the
use of some form of restraint or seclusion, and that restraint
and seclusion are efficacious in preventing injury and
reducing agitation.134 The author also found, however, that
restraint and seclusion can have substantial deleterious
physical and (more often) psychological effects on both
patients and staff.135 The author of a second review article
agreed that “[t]he clinical reality is that an acutely assaultive
and violent patient risks his or her safety and that of other
patients and staff.”136 The author also found, however, that:
(1) staff decision making regarding restraint and seclusion
was inconsistent and that the gender, education level, and
clinical experiences of the staff affected their ordering
decisions; (2) “nonpharmacologic, programmatic changes can
be implemented that diminish dramatically the use of
restraint and seclusion in child/adolescent, and adult
populations”; and (3) “when control of patient aggression is
needed acutely, there are no data to guide clinical decisions
as to which combination of [restraint and seclusion] . . . would
be better in specific patient populations.”137
A third perspective is found in the “survivor literature,”
which collects patients’ unfavorable reports of their
experiences with restraint and seclusion.138
One study

Study, 169 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 37, 37 (1981).
133. David Fassler & Nancy Cotton, A National Survey on the Use of
Seclusion in the Psychiatric Treatment of Children, 43 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 370, 373 (1992).
134. William A. Fisher, Restraint and Seclusion: A Review of the Literature,
151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1584, 1590 (1994).
135. Id. at 1584, 1590.
136. Alisa B. Busch & Miles F. Shore, Seclusion and Restraint: A Review of
Recent Literature, 8 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 261, 262 (2000).
137. Id. at 268.
138. See Patricia A. Amos, New Considerations in the Prevention of Aversives,
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examining such literature found that “patients presented a
universally negative view of the seclusion experience when
reacting directly to the event,”139 and concluded that greater
care is required in the imposition of seclusion.140 A second
study found that patients retrospectively viewed their
seclusion experiences as negative and anxiety-provoking.141 A
third study found from patient descriptions that seclusion
was a “painful experience associated with feelings of
helplessness, fear, sadness, and anger.”142 A widely-cited
study reporting the responses of 1040 former psychiatric
patients regarding their experiences in inpatient psychiatric
treatment facilities in New York State found that the vast
majority of the respondents who had been restrained or
secluded viewed the experience negatively.143 Ninety-four
percent of these respondents noted at least one complaint
about their restraint and seclusion experience144 and seventythree percent of the respondents stated that they were not
dangerous to themselves or others at the time they were
restrained or secluded.145 The New York patients also
indicated that they: (1) did not know the reason for their
restraint or seclusion; (2) felt that the interventions were
humiliating, punishing, and depressing; and (3) thought that
staff control of patients was a primary factor in the use of
restraint and seclusion.146 Patient narratives are prominent
in the survivor literature:
I can’t bring myself to describe the moment-by-moment
struggles and shear gut-wrenching terror of being put into
Restraint, and Seclusion: Incorporating the Role of Relationships into an
Ecological Perspective, 29 RESEARCH & PRACTICE FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE
DISABILITIES 263, 266 (2004).
139. Wadeson & Carpenter, supra note 129, at 327.
140. Id. at 328.
141. Binder & McCoy, supra note 129, at 1053. The study also found,
however, that seclusion remains a necessary method of dealing with violent and
agitated patients. Id.
142. Kathryn Hammill et al., Hospitalized Schizophrenic Patient Views About
Seclusion, 50 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 174, 174 (1989) (finding that patients
believed seclusion was “necessary” for the “control of disruptive aggressive
patient behaviors”).
143. Nancy K. Ray et al., Patient Perspectives on Restraint and Seclusion
Experiences: A Survey of Former Patients of New York State Psychiatric
Facilities, 20 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 11, 11 (1996).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 14.
146. See id. at 15.
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five-point restraint. . . . I don’t feel comfortable wearing
watches any more and for a long time belts were out of the
question. . . . The terror of confinement, the pain of the
restraint, and the wound to my soul made me want to stay
as far away from the mental health system as possible.147

A final perspective is that restraint and seclusion should
be prohibited in the psychiatric setting.148 This position,
which is supported by research showing that physical force,
immobilization, and isolation are dehumanizing and that
seclusion and restraint risk lives and significant emotional
injury,149 is discussed in more detail later in this article.150
The reasons for these varying scientific opinions
regarding restraint and seclusion also have been studied.151
One author suggests that scientific attitudes depend on the
context in which the research was conducted.152 Authors who
support the use of restraint and seclusion may conduct their
research in public psychiatric facilities, while opponents of
these interventions conduct their research in private or
university hospitals.153 A second pair of co-authors suggests
that attitudes about the use of restraint and seclusion depend
on the particular scientific inquiry.154 Scientific inquiries into
the efficaciousness of restraint and seclusion for preventing
violence and aggression tend to support their use, whereas
studies that examine the experience and opinions of patients
who have been restrained and secluded tend to oppose their
use.155

147. William Pflueger, Consumer View: Restraint Is Not Therapeutic,
NETWORKS,
Summer/Fall
2002,
at
7,
7,
available
at
http://www.nasmhpd.org/general_files/publications/ntac_pubs/networks/Summe
rFall2002.pdf.
148. LeBel & Huckshorn, supra note 11, at 577.
149. NATIONAL CALL, supra note 11, at 5; POSITION STATEMENT, supra note
11.
150. See infra Part III.C.
151. See, e.g., Sam Tsemberis & Cornelius Sullivan, Seclusion in Context:
Introducing a Seclusion Room into a Children’s Unit of a Municipal Hospital, 58
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 462 (1988).
152. Id. at 462.
153. See id.
154. Dave Ziegler & Dan Silver, Considering the Literature on Restraint and
Seclusion: Is There Support That These Interventions Are Harmful? 3-4,
available at http://rccp.cornell.edu/pdfs/Zeigler.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
155. See id.
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B. Data Linking Restraint and Seclusion to Injury and
Death
In the past decade, data regarding the use of restraint
and seclusion and related injuries and deaths has been
collected and reported by the media as well as a number of
private and governmental organizations.
The most
prominent of these reports surfaced in 1998, when the
Hartford Courant issued a week-long investigative report into
the number and types of deaths of individuals with
psychiatric or developmental disabilities that occurred across
the nation or shortly after these individuals were restrained
or secluded in psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric units of
general hospitals, group homes, residential facilities for
troubled youths, or centers and group homes for individuals
with intellectual disabilities.156 Many of the 142 deaths
identified by the Courant were caused by asphyxiation,
suffocation, strangulation, smothering, a broken neck, cardiac
arrest, blunt trauma to the head, stress due to restraint,
shock, or dehydration.157 Twenty-three of the 142 individuals,
according to the report, died after staff restrained them by
crossing the individuals’ arms across their chests and placing
them in prone floor holds.158 Another twenty individuals died
after they were tied up in leather wrist and ankle cuffs or
vests, having been ignored for hours.159 The report suggested
that federal and state regulators, health officials, and the
legal system “failed to observe” or “willfully ignored” these
deaths, and recommended mandatory reporting of deaths that
occur during or following restraint or seclusion.160 According
to the Courant report, the mandatory reports should form the
bases of alerts sent to the health care provider community

156. See, e.g., For the Record: 11 Months, 23 Dead, HARTFORD COURANT
(Conn.),
Oct.
11,
1998,
at
A11,
available
at
http://www.pcma.com/crisis_intervention_news/deadly_restraint/faces.stm (part
of the newspaper’s five-part investigative series “Deadly Restraint: A
Nationwide Pattern of Death,” published October 11-15, 1998); Weiss, supra
note 14 (same).
157. Weiss, supra note 14.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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regarding unsafe restraint and seclusion practices.161
Even before the Courant report, state agencies were
collecting and analyzing data regarding the dangers of the
use of psychiatric restraint and seclusion. In 1994, for
example, the New York State Commission on Quality of Care
issued two reports examining restraint and seclusion
practices in New York’s state psychiatric facilities.162 The
second report surveyed former psychiatric patients and found
that “patients who were restrained or secluded during their
inpatient stays “overwhelmingly report[ed] [that] these
interventions were used illegally and that they were often
poorly treated, abused or injured when restrained or
secluded.”163 Approximately one-third of the respondents also
reported that they were concerned for their safety and wellbeing while inpatients, and that their basic rights of dignity
and privacy were violated.164 Other respondents reported
unnecessary force, psychological abuse, physical abuse,
sexual abuse, and ridicule and threats by staff during
restraint and seclusion.165 Still other respondents reported
that restraint and seclusion were used as punishments for not
taking medication or obeying staff.166 Reports regarding the
lack of periodic bathroom, exercise, meal, and water breaks
during episodes of restraint and seclusion also were noted.167
Health care accreditation agencies also have collected
and analyzed data regarding the use of restraint and
seclusion and related injuries and deaths.168 The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) found that the cause of death in forty percent of the

161. See id.
162. See N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON QUALITY OF CARE, RESTRAINT AND
SECLUSION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK STATE PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES (1994);
N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON QUALITY OF CARE, VOICES FROM THE FRONTLINE:
PATIENTS’ PERSPECTIVES OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION USE (1994).
163. N.Y. State Comm’n on Quality of Care, (2 Reports) Restraint and
Seclusion Practices in New York State Psychiatric Facilities, and Voices from
the Frontline: Patients’ Perspectives of Restraint and Seclusion Use, Sept. 1994,
http://www.cqcapd.state.ny.us/publications/pubvoice.htm.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Preventing Restraint Deaths, SENTINEL EVENT ALERT (Joint
Comm’n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs.), Nov. 18, 1998, available at
http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/SentinelEventAlert/sea_8.htm.
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cases reported was asphyxiation, including asphyxiation due
to staff placing excess weight on the back of patients
restrained in the prone position, placing towels or sheets over
patients’ heads to protect against spitting or biting, and
obstructing patients’ airways when pulling the patients’ arms
across their necks.169 JCAHO’s sentinel event alert identified
several strategies for reducing these risks, including more
thorough patient assessments, earlier interventions with less
restrictive measures, adequate staff-to-patient ratios, and the
continuous observance of restrained patients.170
Mental health consumer advocacy organizations such as
the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) have
collected restraint and seclusion use, injury, and death data
and have publicized dangerous restraint and seclusion
practices and incidents.171 According to NAMI, an Oregon
woman was secluded for more than thirty hours in an Oregon
hospital in December 1998 without being allowed to use the
restroom or to contact relatives.172 A man in Missouri was
restrained for twenty-one days and secluded for thirty days in
a state psychiatric hospital in February 1999, resulting in
kidney problems and lost muscle tone.173
In 1999, the United States Government Accountability
Office (GAO) issued a report summarizing many of these data
collection efforts and highlighting the risks associated with
improper restraint and seclusion practices.174 The GAO also
recognized, however, the existence of varying attitudes
regarding the appropriateness of restraint use (including
disagreement about whether restraints are only appropriate
during an emergency and as a response of last resort to a
treatment failure),175 as well as the need for restraint and
seclusion when patients lose control and place themselves or
others at imminent risk of physical harm,176 and the
appropriateness of seclusion in reducing overstimulation,
teaching self-control, and protecting others.177 The GAO
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-9.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
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found that no comprehensive reporting system to track
injuries and deaths involving the use of restraint and
seclusion existed and that federal and state regulations
governing restraint and seclusion in the psychiatric and
intellectual disability settings were inconsistent across
facility type.178 The ultimate recommendation of the GAO
was to reduce the use of restraint and seclusion by adopting
policies identifying permissible restraint and seclusion
practices, reporting instances of restraint and seclusion,
training staff regarding safe use of and alternatives to
restraint and seclusion,179 and maintaining adequate staff-topatient ratios.180
Private and governmental organizations continue to
collect data regarding inappropriate restraint and seclusion
practices and the dangers associated with these
interventions. Patients reportedly continue to be restrained
for “trivial offenses,” such as failing to sit at a particular
dining room table.181 Nurses apparently agree only eight
percent of the time regarding whether a particular situation
will escalate into violence or destruction of property and,
thus, whether restraints or seclusion should be ordered.182
Many restrained and secluded patients report feeling
punished, humiliated, and de-humanized.183 A culture of
control and force reportedly continues to pervade psychiatric
facility management and staff, and the use of restraint and
seclusion is believed to be evidence of the down-flow of that
culture to patient care.184 Fifty to 150 American deaths each
year reportedly are caused by the use of restraint and
seclusion.185

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 20.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERCOMING BARRIERS AND PROTECTING
CONSUMER
RIGHTS
(2003),
available
at
http://alt.samhsa.gov/seclusion/SRMay5report6.htm [hereinafter OVERCOMING
BARRIERS].
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. Id.
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C. The Current Restraint- and Seclusion-Free Discourse
It is not surprising that the current restraint and
seclusion discourse focuses on the reduction and elimination
of the use of restraint and seclusion in the psychiatric setting.
The underlying themes of this discourse are that restraint
and seclusion are neither positive nor therapeutic
interventions; that restraint and seclusion are labor-intensive
acts of violence that are less effective than alternative deescalation strategies; that restraint and seclusion themselves
(and not just their inappropriate use) are the cause of
physical and psychological injury and death; and that the use
of restraint and seclusion is evidence that the mental health
care system is not working correctly.186
These themes are communicated through the literature
of both private and governmental organizations. In 1999, the
National Association of State Mental Health Program
Directors (NASMHPD) issued a formal statement clarifying
its position that restraint and seclusion are safety
interventions of last resort, not treatment interventions, and
stating its goal of reducing “and ultimately eliminating”
restraint and seclusion use.187 The federal Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) in
2003 formally stated its goal of “ultimately eliminating the
use of restraint and seclusion in behavioral healthcare
settings.”188 In 2005, SAMHSA issued as part of its National
Action Plan a training manual designed to achieve “restraintfree mental health care.”189
The Alliance to Prevent
Restraint, Aversive Interventions, and Seclusion (APRAIS)
formally stated in 2005 its vision that “children with
disabilities should grow up “free from the use of restraint and
seclusion . . . and from the fear that these forms of behavior
management will be used on themselves, their siblings or
their friends.”190 The rhetoric of restraint- and seclusion-free
186. See, e.g., id.
187. See POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 11.
188. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ROADMAP TO SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT FREE
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 3 (2005).
189. See id. at 5 (“The goal of this curriculum is to provide direct care staff
the tools and knowledge needed to improve their skills in preventing and
ultimately eliminating the use of seclusion and restraint.”).
190. ALLIANCE TO PREVENT RESTRAINT, AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS, &
SECLUSION, IN THE NAME OF TREATMENT: A PARENT’S GUIDE TO PROTECTING
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mental health care continues today, with organizations such
as the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health hosting training
institutes for organizations committed to eliminating the use
of restraint and seclusion use191 and with federal and state
lawmakers attempting to establish restraint- and seclusionfree psychiatric environments.192
In summary, perspectives regarding the use of restraint
and seclusion vary. Searching for ways to prevent patient
self-injury and violence to others in acute inpatient
populations, clinicians and scientists in the mid-to-late
twentieth century studied the efficacy of restraint and
seclusion and concluded that these interventions had a wide
range of accepted and appropriate uses.193 Additional studies
conducted at the turn of the twentieth century focus less on
the efficacy of restraint and seclusion for preventing selfinjury and violence and more on patients’ perspectives of
their past restraint and seclusion experiences. From this
patient perspective, restraint and seclusion are viewed as
psychologically harmful. Finally, the collection and analysis
of restraint and seclusion data in the late 1900s and early
2000s shows that the use of restraint and seclusion can and
has caused significant harm, including death, in child,
adolescent, and adult psychiatric populations. Critics of the
latter two perspectives argue that the one hundred-plus
YOUR CHILD FROM THE USE OF RESTRAINT, AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS, AND
SECLUSION 2 (2005).
191. See Hogg Found. for Mental Health, Seclusion & Restraint Reduction:
Training
Institute
Instructional
Materials,
http://www.hogg.utexas.edu/programs_S&Rtraining_docs.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2007) (noting that a training institute was held in September 2006 for
organizations committed to the ultimate elimination of restraint and seclusion
use).
192. See, e.g., Child and Adolescent Mental Health Resiliency Act of 2006, S.
3449, 109th Cong. (2006) (introducing a federal bill that would require the
development and dissemination of educational materials that encourage ending
the use of restraint and seclusion in all facilities or programs that care for
children and adolescents, as well as the training of mental health professionals
and others on alternatives to restraint and seclusion); 104 MASS. CODE REGS.
27.12(1) (2006) (requiring private, county, and municipal mental health
facilities in Massachusetts to develop a plan to eliminate, wherever possible, the
use of restraint and seclusion).
193. See, e.g., Binder & McCoy, supra note 129, at 1052 (“[S]eclusion is an
accepted treatment modality on many psychiatric inpatient units . . . .”); Cotton,
supra note 3, at 442 (discussing at length the psychiatric benefits of seclusion);
Wadeson & Carpenter, supra note 129, at 318 (“The seclusion room is an
important, but ambivalently perceived aspect of psychiatric inpatient units.”).
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restraint- and seclusion-related deaths is unfortunate, but
pales in comparison to other causes of death in the health
care context and has been over-dramatized by the media.
Part III thus provides a balanced review of the relevant
medical literature and available data. A dialogue regarding
the criteria, if any, that justify the continued use of these
interventions must take into account both their risks and
benefits. Relying on the persuasive survivor literature and
sentinel event data, although somewhat downplaying the
studies showing that restraint and seclusion are efficacious in
preventing patient self-injury and violence in psychiatric
emergencies, many mental health consumer advocacy
organizations are lobbying to eliminate the use of restraint
and seclusion in the psychiatric setting. The question thus
becomes whether legislative adoption of these elimination
strategies will solve the restraint and seclusion controversy
once and for all.
IV. RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION
A. Human Rights Principles
To address this question, an understanding of current
restraint and seclusion regulation is necessary. The bulk of
this Part focuses on federal and state law; however, it is
important to note that restraint and seclusion are considered
important international human rights issues as well. During
the last century, human rights organizations have found
patients in international psychiatric facilities caged on their
beds (via metal frames built two to three feet over the bed
with a wire or net mesh enclosing the sides and the top) for
hours and days, lying in their own urine and feces.194 At one
facility, staff reportedly locked patients in their rooms from
the afternoon until the next morning whenever staffing levels
were insufficient.195 In response to these and other concerns,
194. ERIC ROSENTHAL & CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH
LEGISLATION 59 (2004); see also Oliver Lewis, Mental Disability Law in Central
and Eastern Europe: Paper, Practice, Promise, 8 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 293, 299
(2002) (describing the use of caged beds in Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the
Czech Republic, and Slovenia).
195. ROSENTHAL & SUNDRAM, supra note 195, at 59.
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the United Nations General Assembly in 1991 adopted the
“Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness
and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care” (MI
Principles).196 Although the MI Principles are a non-binding
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, they are
used as a guide to the interpretation of related provisions of
international human rights conventions.197
Under MI
Principles, patients in mental health facilities have the right
to be treated in the least restrictive environment appropriate
to the patient’s health needs and the need to protect the
physical safety of others.198 The MI Principles also contain a
number of procedural safeguards designed to prevent abuse.
Practitioners working in mental health facilities must record
each use of restraint or seclusion in the patient’s record along
with an explanation of the clinical justification for the
intervention.199
B. Federal Law
Restraint and seclusion practices are an international
and national concern.
Following years of overcrowded,
understaffed, dangerous, and dehumanizing conditions at
Bryce Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued its
seminal opinion in Wyatt v. Stickney.200 Among other things,
Wyatt established three important common law principles
relating to the use of restraint and seclusion. First, patients
with mental health conditions generally have the right to be
free from restraint and seclusion.201 Second, restraint and
seclusion may be used in an emergency situation, defined as a
situation in which a patient might harm himself or others,
196. Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the
Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 49) Annex at 188-192, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991) [hereinafter MI Principles].
197. Angelika C. Moncada, Comment, Involuntary Commitment and the Use
of Seclusion and Restraint in Uruguay: A Comparison with the United Nations
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness, 25 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 589, 593 (1994); Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein,
International Human Rights Advocacy Under the “Principles for the Protection
of Persons with Mental Illness,” 16 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257, 257 (1993).
198. MI Principles, supra note 198, at princ. 9(1).
199. Id.
200. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
201. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 379-80.
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but only if less restrictive methods of preventing such harm
are not feasible.202 Third, if a patient is to be restrained or
secluded, a qualified mental health professional203 must have
personally seen the episode justifying the restraint or
seclusion, evaluated the patient, and ordered in writing the
restraint or seclusion for no more than a short, finite period of
time.204
Subsequent federal decisions clarified that restraints
may be imposed only in conjunction with treatment (in other
words, treatment is society’s quid pro quo for the deprivation
of personal liberty)205 and that institutional residents have a
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable restraints206
and seclusion.207 The determination of whether a restraint is
reasonable, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, depends on
whether professional judgment was exercised when the
restraint was ordered.208
Wyatt was very influential at the national level. Among
other things, the opinion influenced the Task Force on Legal
and Ethical Issues of the President’s Commission on Mental
Health (Commission), which in turn motivated Congress’
enactment of the Bill of Rights section of the Mental Health
Systems Act (MHSA) in 1980.209 The MHSA states that

202. Id. at 380.
203. Id. at 379 (defining a qualified mental health professional as a
psychiatrist, a psychologist with a doctoral degree, certain social workers with
master’s degrees and additional psychiatric clinical experience, and certain
registered nurses with graduate degrees in psychiatric nursing and additional
psychiatric clinical experience).
204. Id. at 380.
205. Aderholt, 503 F.2d at 1312 (citing Donaldson v. O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507
(5th Cir. 1974)).
206. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (quoting Greenholtz v.
Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
207. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1374 (D. Mass. 1979) (enjoining a
state institution for individuals with mental illness from placing patients in
seclusion except in emergency situations in which there is an occurrence or
serious threat of extreme violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated by Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
208. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324 (“The State also has the unquestioned duty
to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the
institution. And it may not restrain residents except when and to the extent
professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety or to provide
needed training.”).
209. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL
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persons receiving mental health services have the right to
treatment in a setting and under conditions that are most
supportive of their personal liberty and restrict such liberty
only to the extent necessary consistent with such person’s
The Commission also recommended that
treatment.210
individuals have the right to be free from restraint or
seclusion imposed for reasons other than treatment or in an
emergency situation.211 Restraint and seclusion imposed for
treatment or in an emergency situation, according to the
Commission, should require the written order of a mental
health professional.212 Congress restated these rights in 1986
in its Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients (Bill of
Rights).213 Although the MHSA and the Bill of Rights
indicate Congress’ concern regarding inappropriate use of
restraint and seclusion, these provisions have little teeth.
Neither the MHSA nor the Bill of Rights establishes any
enforceable rights or duties, including a private right of
action.214 The MHSA and the Bill of Rights are merely
precatory; they do no more than express a Congressional
preference for appropriate use of restraint and seclusion.215
Although federal administrative agencies have attempted
to impose enforceable duties relating to the use of restraint
and seclusion on various types of health care providers, these
efforts lacked specific applicability to the psychiatric setting
until 1999. The Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA)216 in 1988 adopted final regulations governing the use
of restraint and seclusion in intermediate care facilities for

AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS

1093 (4th ed. 2004).
210. Mental Health Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9501(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000).
211. Id. § 9501(1)(F).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 10841.
214. Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D.
Mass. 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1992); Brooks v. Johnson & Johnson,
Inc., 685 F. Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
215. See Brooks, 685 F. Supp. at 108.
216. On July 1, 2001, the federal agency known as the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) became the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS). CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2002 FACT
SHEET: FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER PROVIDERS: KEY NEWS FROM MEDICARE
2002,
at
1,
available
at
FOR
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Transmittals/downloads/B0165.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,
2007).

TOVINO FINAL

544

8/8/2007 11:12:33 AM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 47

individuals with mental retardation.217 These regulations
restrict the use of restraints to an “integral part of an
individual program plan that is intended to lead to less
restrictive means of managing and eliminating the behavior
for which the restraint is applied” and to emergency
measures that are necessary to protect the individual or
others from injury.218
In 1991, HCFA adopted final
regulations governing the use of restraint and seclusion in
nursing homes that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs.219 These regulations ban all non-medical use of
restraint220 and all use of seclusion221 in covered nursing
homes.
Although both sets of regulations clarify the
appropriate use of restraint and seclusion in a range of longterm care settings, they fail to address the use of restraint
and seclusion in behavior management in the psychiatric
setting.222
As part of its ongoing revisions to its Conditions of
Participation for Hospitals (COPs), HCFA adopted in 1999 an
interim final rule governing the use of restraint and seclusion
for behavior management in public and private psychiatric
hospitals and psychiatric units in general hospitals that
participate in the Medicare Program.223 The 1999 interim
final rule, which was inspired in part by the Hartford
Courant report identifying 142 restraint- and seclusionrelated deaths,224 acknowledged that in some emergency
situations the use of restraint may be the least harmful way
to protect an individual’s safety and the safety of others.225

217. 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.450(c)-(d) (2006). The phrase “intellectual disability” is
preferable to “mental retardation.” I use “mental retardation” here to ensure
consistency with the regulations.
218. Id. §§ 483.450(d)(1)(i)-(ii).
219. Id. §§ 483.13(a)-(b).
220. Id. § 483.13(a).
221. Id. § 483.13(b).
222. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (“The federal government regulates the
use of restraint and seclusion in nursing homes and Intermediate Care
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, but until recently, no federal regulations
governed their use in other facilities, such as psychiatric hospitals . . . .”).
223. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(f).
224. 64 Fed. Reg. 36,070, 36,070 (July 2, 1999) (codified at 42 CFR pt. 482)
(discussing why HCFA needed to issue the patients’ rights COP); id. at 36,078
(discussing the heightened awareness of unsafe restraint and seclusion
practices due to media attention).
225. Id. at 36,078.
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The interim final rule thus required a balancing of interests:
[W]e believe that it is critical to reinforce appropriate
restraints reduction by acknowledging the patient’s right
to be free from restraints except when the use of a
restraint is the least restrictive option that will provide
the greatest benefit to the patient (that is, the risks
associated with the use of the restraint are outweighed by
the risk of not using it).226

This balancing was formally codified in the COPs as a
regulatory permission to use restraint227 and seclusion,228 but
only if needed to ensure the patient’s physical safety and less
restrictive interventions have been determined to be
ineffective to protect the patient or others from harm.229
In 2000, Congress enacted The Children’s Health Act
(CHA), one section of which amended part of the Public
Health Service Act to establish minimum requirements
regarding the use of restraint and seclusion in health care
facilities that receive federal funds.230 To conform the 1999
interim final rule to the requirements set forth in the CHA,
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued
new restraint and seclusions regulations in December 2006.231
Effective January 2007, the new regulations emphasize that
patients in Medicare-participating hospitals have the right to
be free from unnecessary restraint232 or seclusion,233 and that
convenience, punishment, retaliation and coercion are not

226. Id. at 36,080.
227. The COPs define restraint as a physical restraint or a drug that is used
as a restraint. 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(e)(1)(i)(A)-(B). Physical restraints include
any manual method or physical or mechanical device, material, or equipment
attached or adjacent to the patient’s body that the patient cannot easily remove
that restricts the patient’s freedom of movement or bodily access. Id. at §
482.13(e)(1)(i)(A). Drugs used as a restraint include medications used to control
behavior or to restrict the patient’s freedom of movement that are not part of
the standard treatment for the patient’s medical or psychiatric condition. Id. at
§ 482.13(e)(1)(i)(B).
228. The COPs define seclusion as the involuntary confinement of a person in
a room or an area where the person is physically prevented from leaving. Id. at
§ 482.13(e)(1)(ii).
229. Id. at §§ 482.13(e)(2)-(3).
230. Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3207 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 290ii (2000)).
231. Patients’ Rights Conditions of Participation, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,378, 71,379
(Dec. 8, 2006) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e) (2007)).
232. See supra note 1 (providing the new regulatory definition of restraint).
233. See supra note 2 (providing the new regulatory definition of seclusion).
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new
acceptable reasons to use these interventions.234 The
regulations contain several subtle and not-so-subtle changes
from the 1999 interim final rule. Like the 1999 interim final
rule, the new regulations establish a laundry list of
requirements that must be satisfied before restraint or
seclusion may be imposed on a patient receiving care at a
Medicare-participating hospital.235
First and foremost,
restraint or seclusion only may be used when a physician or
other licensed independent practitioner (LIP) determines that
less restrictive interventions have been ineffective to protect
the patient, a staff member, or others from harm.236 Unless
superseded by a more stringent state law, “each order for
restraint or seclusion used for the management of violent or
self-destructive behavior that jeopardizes the immediate
physical safety of the patient, a staff member, or others” is
limited to four hours for adults eighteen years of age or older,
two hours for children and adolescents nine to seventeen
years of age, and one hour for children under nine years of
age.237 When restraint and seclusion are used for the
management of violent or self-destructive behavior, a
physician, other LIP, registered nurse, or physician assistant
with appropriate training must see the patient face-to-face
within one hour after the intervention and must evaluate,
among other things, the patient’s reaction to the intervention,
the patient’s medical and behavioral condition, and the need
to continue or terminate the intervention.238 Regardless of
the length of time identified in the initial order, the
practitioner must discontinue the intervention at the earliest
possible time.239
The
new regulations strengthen the training
requirements applicable to physicians and other LIPs who
order restraint and seclusion. Patients now have the right to
safe implementation of restraint or seclusion by a trained
staff member.240 Hospital policies must specify applicable

234. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e) (2007);
Participation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 71,380.
235. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e).
236. Id. § 482.13(e)(2).
237. Id. § 482.13(e)(8)(i).
238. Id. §§ 482.13(e)(12)(i)-(ii).
239. Id. § 482.13(e)(9).
240. Id. § 482.13(f).

Patients’

Rights

Conditions

of

TOVINO FINAL

8/8/2007 11:12:33 AM

2007] PSYCHIATRIC RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION

547

training requirements, and physicians and LIPs must have a
working knowledge of their hospital’s policies regarding
restraint and seclusion.241 Staff must be able to demonstrate
competency in the application of restraints, the
implementation of seclusion, and the monitoring and
assessment of patients on whom restraint and seclusion have
been imposed as part of their initial workplace orientation
and subsequently on a periodic basis.242 The training must
address the use of nonphysical intervention skills, behavioral
changes that indicate that restraint and seclusion is no longer
necessary, and staff and patient behaviors, events, and
environmental factors that trigger instances of restraint and
seclusion.243
The new regulations also impose more stringent
reporting requirements. Hospital must report to CMS each
death that occurs while a patient is in restraint or seclusion,
each death that occurs within twenty-four hours after the
patient has been removed from restraint or seclusion, and
each death known to the hospital that occurs within one week
after restraint or seclusion where it is reasonable to assume
that use of restraint or placement in seclusion contributed
directly or indirectly to a patient’s death.244 Hospitals must
make the required reports no later than the close of the next
business day following knowledge of the patient’s death.245
In summary, the new regulations attempt to minimize
unsafe restraint and seclusion practices by: (1) establishing
criteria for the imposition of restraint and seclusion; (2)
identifying the individuals who are permitted to order
restraint and seclusion; (3) limiting the length of time for
which restraint and seclusion may be imposed; (4)
strengthening the training requirements applicable to health
care professionals involved in the imposition of these
interventions; and (5) requiring the reporting of a broader
class of patient deaths. The COPs do not, however, require
Medicare-participating hospitals or psychiatric facilities to
establish restraint- and seclusion-free environments.246
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(11).
Id. § 482.13(f)(1).
Id. § 482.13(f)(2).
Id. § 482.13(g)(1).
Id. § 482.13(g)(2).
Hospitals, behavioral health care providers, and other health care
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C. State Law
States have long been interested in the regulation of
restraint and seclusion use. Like other state legislatures
during the early twentieth century, the Texas Legislature
enacted in 1925 House Bill 249 (HB 249), a thencomprehensive piece of mental health legislation, one purpose
of which was to regulate the restraint of state hospital
patients who were classified as insane, mentally ill, or
mentally defective.247 HB 249 defined restraint to include
both “therapeutic and chemical restraint[s]” and “confinement
in a strong room as well as seclusion in solitary confinement,”
although it excepted from the definition “the prolonged bath,
the hot or cold pack, or a medication when it is used as a
remedial measure and not as a form of restraint.”248 HB 249
restricted state hospitals from imposing restraints in the form
of “muffs, waist straps, wristlets, anklets, camisoles, lock
chairs, lock cribs, protection sheets or other devices

organizations that have received accreditation by a national accreditation body,
such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO), generally are considered to be in compliance with the relevant COPs.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Psychiatric Health Sys. v. Shalala, 120 F. Supp.2d 33, 35
(D.D.C. 2000). JCAHO accredits approximately eighty percent of the hospitals
that participate in the Medicare program. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
JCAHO standards relating to restraint and seclusion are thus relevant.
JCAHO has and enforces both hospital and behavioral health care standards.
See JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS. [JCAHO], 2006
HOSPITAL
ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS
(2006),
available
at
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/F42AF828-7248-48C0-B4E6BA18E719A87C/0/06_hap_accred_stds.pdf; JCAHO, APPROVED STANDARDS
ADDITIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES (2006), available at
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/09CDAFFB-D502-40C7-973CA935DF05BC5C/0/bhc_recovery_oriented_stds.pdf. Like the COPs, the JCAHO
standards attempt to minimize unsafe restraint and seclusion practices by
regulating the individuals who can order restraint and seclusion, the criteria for
the imposition of restraint and seclusion, and the maximum length of time for
which restraint and seclusion may be ordered, as well as establishing
administrative and reporting requirements. See, e.g., JCAHO, 2006 HOSPITAL
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra. JCAHO’s revised restraint and seclusion
standard, effective January 1, 2001, allows restraint and seclusion to be used,
but “only in an emergency, when there is an imminent risk of an individual
physically harming himself or herself or others, including staff.” See JCAHO,
THE
STANDARD
8
(2007),
available
at
SETTING
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/6C33FEDB-BB50-4CEE-950BA6246DA4911E/0/setting_the_standard.pdf. The JCAHO standards do not
require the elimination of restraint and seclusion in the psychiatric setting.
247. H.B. 249, 1925 Leg., 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws 407.
248. Id. § 21, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws at 414.
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interfering with free movement” unless the restraints were
applied in the presence of the superintendent of the hospital,
or of a physician, or an assistant physician employed by the
institution, or on his written order preserved in the records of
the institution. In addition, the case must have involved
“extreme violence, active, homicidal and suicidal condition,
physical exhaustion, infectious disease or following an
operation or acts which have caused serious bodily injury.”249
HB 249 did carve out an emergency exception permitting the
use of restraints without the presence of the superintendent
or a physician and without a written order if, after the
imposition of the restraint, the use of the restraint was
immediately reported to the superintendent or to a physician
who immediately investigated the case and approved or
disapproved of the restraint imposed.250
HB 249 further required the superintendent, physician,
or assistant physician to personally keep under lock and key
all implements or devices of restraint not in actual use,251 to
document all cases of restraint use, and to make such records
available to the governing body of mental hospitals in the
state (the Board of Control) upon request.252 The records
were required to include “the cause for [the restraint], the
form used, the name of the patient, the time when the patient
was placed under restraint and the time when released.”253
State hospitals and employees who knowingly violated or
willingly permitted the violation of the prohibitions against
restraint were subject to fines of $50 to $300.254
In the mid-twentieth century, state legislatures codified
their various mental health laws, including their restraint
and seclusion laws, into separate mental health codes.255 For
example, faculty members of The University of Texas School
of Law, with help from the Hogg Foundation for Mental

249. Id. § 19, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws at 413-14.
250. Id.
251. Id. § 20, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws at 414.
252. Id. § 21, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws at 414.
253. Tex. H.B. 249.
254. Id. § 22.
255. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1740 (2005), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mentalhealthcode_113313_7.pdf
§
330.1742,
available
at
(pertaining
to
restraint);
Id.
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mentalhealthcode_113313_7.pdf
(pertaining to seclusion).
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Health and other public advocacy groups, drafted in 1957 the
basis of Texas House Bill 6 (HB 6). When passed by the
Texas Legislature, HB 6 established Texas’ new Mental
Health Code.256 One purpose of the Mental Health Code was
to protect “the rights and liberty of every one.” To that end,
the Mental Health Code generally prohibited physical
restraint use, although it did contain an exception for
restraints that were prescribed by a physician, removed as
soon as possible, and documented in the patient’s medical
record under the signature of the ordering physician.
Other states’ mental health codes similarly regulated the
use of restraint and seclusion257 and, today, many states limit
these interventions to “behavioral emergencies.”258 A
behavioral emergency is defined as a situation in which
preventive, de-escalative, or verbal techniques have been
considered and determined to be ineffective and it is
necessary to prevent an individual from imminent death and
substantial bodily harm to either himself or others.259 Most
states also expressly prohibit the use of restraint or seclusion
as a form of discipline or punishment, for convenience, as a
substitute for effective treatment, or to compensate for
inadequate staffing.260 These latter provisions perhaps are a
response to statements in mandatory annual reports drafted
by state insane asylums during the nineteenth century261
indicating that restraints were imposed notwithstanding the
prevailing theory of moral treatment when an insufficient
256. Tex. Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 1, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505.
257. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1740.
258. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 415.261 (2006).
259. Id. § 415.253(a)(2) (2006).
260. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-115(8) (2005) (“Physical restraint
shall not be employed as punishment, for the convenience of staff, or as a
substitute for a program of services and supports.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a550(b)(8) (2006) (stating that each patient shall be “free from mental and
physical abuse, corporal punishment, involuntary seclusion and any physical or
chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not
required to treat the patient's medical symptoms”); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
394.459(4)(c) (West 2006) (“A facility may not use seclusion or restraint for
punishment, to compensate for inadequate staffing, or for the convenience of
staff.”).
261. As an example, an 1858 Texas law made it the duty of the
superintendent of the State’s Lunatic Asylum to “keep a register of all patients
received and discharged, and of the operations of the Asylum, . . . and report the
general results to the Governor on the first day of October of each year.” 1858
Tex. Gen. Laws 117, ch. 93 § 10.
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number of attendants were responsible for supervising too
large a number of highly excited patients.262 Many states now
prohibit the use of restraint and seclusion to compensate for
inadequate staffing,263 although their legislatures have not
provided the requested appropriations that would secure an
adequate number of trained staff members.
For some states, regulations limiting the use of restraint
and seclusion to behavioral emergencies were insufficient.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania became so concerned
about the dangers associated with restraint and seclusion
that a representative of the Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare announced in 1997 and that restraint use
should be eliminated altogether.264
262. One such annual report stated:
In the thing of RESTRAINT, MECHANICAL AND CHEMICAL, one
about as bad as the other—neither to be thought of in a properly
organized, well conducted hospital for the insane. All authorities upon
the management of the insane condemn both. . . . It might be stated
that as the quality of personal attendance improves the record will
show a diminished amount of mechanical restraint, so that the latter
may be regarded in some degree a gauge or measure of the former. . . .
....
. . . Although the medical officers of the Institution are as much
opposed to mechanical restraint as any one can be, and reprobate its
use as strongly, yet, owing to the lack of suitable attendants upon an
excited household, have been compelled to hold recourse to it, in some
of its most objectionable forms. Between 50 and 60 patients, all more
or less and not a few highly excited, in wards with their gallery
attachments over 200 feet long, with two attendants to look after them,
besides the ward work to do, what was to be done? Sleeves, muffs,
wristlets, crib-beds and other relics of barbarism in the treatment of
the insane—“tell if not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon,
lest the uncircumcised rejoice”—have been freely used; no help for it.
But where there are but two attendants on such wards, the dining
room attendant who properly keeps a dining room for fifty patients—
the china closet, knives, forks, spoons, crockery and glassware—in the
condition they are required to be kept in this Institution, finds little
time for ward work. On Sundays, when one of the ward attendants has
an off, as is the custom of all institutions of this kind, there is but one
attendant most of the time on the ward.
N. TEX. HOSP. FOR THE INSANE, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 12-13 (1888) (internal
citations omitted); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at 149 (“Attendants were
too few—only one for every fifteen patients—to allow close supervision to
obviate mechanical restraints.”).
263. See, e.g., supra note 263.
264. Susan Stefan, Successful Restraint and Seclusion Reduction Programs
as Quality Indicators for Psychiatric Services, MEDSCAPE, Apr. 10, 2006,
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/528949_2 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
More recently, New Jersey Assemblyman Eric Munoz introduced in 2006 a bill
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Other lawmakers appear less certain about the need to
completely eliminate the use of restraint and seclusion in the
psychiatric context. In February 2006, New York
Assemblyman Peter Rivera introduced a bill that would
loosen his state’s Mental Hygiene Law to permit certain
physician assistants and nurse practitioners to order the
restraint of a patient.265 South Carolina Senator Thomas
Alexander introduced similar legislation in March 2005 that
would amend his state’s Rights of Mental Health Patients Act
to permit licensed independent practitioners to order
restraint or seclusion in a mental health or alcohol and drug
abuse facility.266
Still other states are taking a middle position that
supports more stringent regulation designed to reduce unsafe
restraint and seclusion practices, while not eliminating the
interventions altogether. In 2005, the Texas Legislature
clarified that mental hospitals, mental facilities, and several
other classes of institutions may not administer a restraint
that obstructs a patient’s airway, impairs a patient’s
breathing, or interferes with the patient’s ability to
communicate.267 The Texas Legislature further clarified that
prone (face-down) or supine (face-up) holds may be used only
for certain limited periods of time, as a last resort when other
less restrictive interventions have proven to be ineffective,
and when a trained observer ensures that the patient’s

limiting the use of restraint and seclusion in state facilities servicing
individuals with developmental disabilities. H.B. 948, 2006 Leg., 212th
Assemb. (N.J. 2006). Outside the psychiatric and developmental disability
context, a number of state legislatures recently have considered bills that would
regulate the use of restraint and seclusion in public schools. See, e.g., S.B. 906,
2005 Gen. Assemb. Sess. (N.C. 2005); H.B. 1792, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2005). Over the last ten years, Pennsylvania’s goal of restraint and seclusion
elimination was incorporated at the federal level, including by Senator Chris
Dodd’s Child and Adolescent Mental Health Resiliency Act of 2006. See Child
and Adolescent Mental Health Resiliency Act of 2006, S. 3449, 109th Cong.
(2006). Introduced to Congress on June 6, 2006, Senate Bill 3449 would amend
the Public Health Service Act to require the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to develop and disseminate educational materials
that encourage eliminating the use of restraint and seclusion in all facilities or
programs that care for children and adolescents, and to train mental health
professionals and others on alternatives to restraint and seclusion. Id.
265. A. 9986, 2006 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006).
266. S. 683, 2005 Leg., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005-2006).
267. S.B. 325, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005) (codified at TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 322.051(a) (Vernon 2005)).
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breathing is not impaired.268 The legislation also charges
Texas’ administrative agencies with adopting implementing
regulations that define acceptable restraint holds, address the
use of seclusion, and develop practices to decrease the
frequency of the use of restraint and seclusion.269
Other states continue to study the best legislative
direction. Connecticut, for example, introduced a bill in 2006
that would require two state commissioners to review the
extent to which individuals with psychiatric disabilities are
afforded certain rights required by statute, including the
right to restrictions on the imposition of mechanical restraint
and seclusion.270 The commissioners are to report their
findings and recommendations to the Connecticut General
Assembly no later than July 1, 2007.271
V. CONTEXTUALIZING THE RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION
PROBLEM
I now return to the question of whether the centuries-old
restraint and seclusion controversy will be solved by
legislation, as proposed by mental health consumer advocacy
organizations, eliminating the psychiatric use of these
interventions.
Here I argue that blanket elimination
strategies should not be adopted without first disentangling
more fundamental problems relating to mental health care
access and finance.
A. Lack of Access to and Financing for Basic Mental Health
Care
Studies show that the factors that contribute to the use of
restraint and seclusion are similar to the factors that lead to
inpatient psychiatric admission.272 These factors include
extreme aggression, assaultive behavior, attempted suicide,

268. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 322.051(b) (Vernon 2005).
269. Id. § 322.052(a).
270. H.B. 5542, Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006).
271. Id.
272. See Cotton, supra note 3, at 443-45; William T. Garrison, Aggressive
Behavior Seclusion and Physical Restraint in an Inpatient Child Population, 23
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 448, 448 (1984); Paramjit T. Joshi et al., Use of
the Quiet Room on an Inpatient Unit, 27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 642, 642 (1988); Paul H. Soloff, Seclusion and Restraint in 1985: A
Review and Update, HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 652, 652 (1985).
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self-injury including cutting, and destruction of property
using fire, feces, and other means.273 Individuals who engage
in these behaviors frequently have pathological family
histories, attentional and learning problems, poor self-esteem
and impulse control, maladaptive coping strategies, and
immature defenses.274 Socially, these individuals tend to “live
in poverty with family histories of loss, violence, neglect, and
abuse.”275 The therapeutic management of these individuals
requires basic mental health care interventions that can help
stop these maladaptive cycles and initiate healthier processes
of adaptation and development.276
Early detection, assessment, and linkage with mental
health treatment and support can prevent mental health
problems from compounding into conditions that may lead to
restraint and seclusion.277 Early mental health interventions
may lessen long-term conditions that breed violent and
assaultive behavior.278 On the other hand, “untreated and
undertreated”
mental
illness,
especially
paranoid
schizophrenia, predisposes individuals to attempted suicide,
homicide, and other aggressive behaviors that can lead to the
use of restraint and seclusion.279
All of these studies suggest that access to basic mental
health care can help individuals avoid more serious mental
health conditions, the symptomatic behaviors of which may
lead to the use of restraint and seclusion. Unfortunately, it
goes without saying that not all Americans have access to
basic mental health care. Although one in five American
children have a mental disorder,280 and between five and nine

273. See Cotton, supra note 3, at 444.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING
THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 57 (2003)
[hereinafter PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM].
278. Id. at 60 (citing JACK P. SHONKOFF & DEBORAH A. PHILLIPS, FROM
NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD
DEVELOPMENT (2000)).
279. Sharfstein, supra note 119, at 1.
280. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, FAST FACTS ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO SERVICES FOR CHILDREN WITH SERIOUS MENTAL
HEALTH
NEEDS
(2004),
available
at
http://www.bazelon.org/issues/insurance/factsheets/children.pdf
[hereinafter
BAZELON] (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH:
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percent of children have a serious emotional disturbance,281
approximately twelve percent of American children are
Seventy-nine percent of children and
uninsured.282
adolescents who have mental health conditions that require
evaluation did not receive any evaluation or mental health
treatment in 1997.283 Twenty percent of non-elderly adults
are uninsured, and the majority of adults with mental health
problems also did not receive a mental health evaluation or
treatment in the previous year.284 According to the U.S.
Surgeon General, less than one-third of adults with a
diagnosable mental disorder, and even a smaller proportion of
children, receive mental health services in a given year.285 In
summary, access to basic mental health care can help
individuals avoid more serious conditions that may lead to
the use of restraint and seclusion.
Unfortunately, it goes without saying that even for those
children and adults who are insured, mental health coverage
is not always obtainable.286 Access to mental health care is
restricted by private health insurance coverage limits, public
insurance eligibility restrictions, and shortfalls in state
budgets.287 Notwithstanding federal and state laws that
attempted to ensure parity in mental health care coverage,288
eighty-seven percent of health plans that complied with these
laws place limits on mental health coverage that they do not
place on medical or surgical care.289 Of these health plans,

A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1999)).
281. Id. (citing PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM, supra note 278).
282. Id. (citing KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HEALTH
COVERAGE IN AMERICA: 2002 DATA UPDATE (2003)).
283. See id.
284. See id. (”Adults are more likely to be uninsured than children because
public coverage is designed primarily to help low-income children.”).
285. NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, A CALL FOR INVESTMENT: EXPANDING
COMMUNITY-BASED MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 2 (2000).
286. BAZELON, supra note 281, at 2 (citing Ctr. on an Aging Soc’y,
Georgetown Univ., Issue Brief: Child & Adolescent Mental Health Services: Whose
Responsibility is it to Ensure Care?, DATA PROFILES (2003), available at
http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/agingsociety/pdfs/mentalhealth.pdf).
287. Id.
288. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2001); NAT’L
MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, WHAT HAVE STATES DONE TO ENSURE INSURANCE
PARITY? (2005), available at http://www1.nmha.org/state/parity/state_parity.pdf
(summarizing state mental health parity laws).
289. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO/HEHS-00-95, MENTAL
HEALTH
PARITY
ACT
5
(2000),
available
at
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sixty-six percent have lower outpatient office visit limits,
sixty-five percent have lower hospital day limits, twentyseven percent have higher outpatient office visit co-payments,
and twenty-five percent have higher outpatient office visit coThese statistics are significant given the
insurance.290
expense of mental health care.291 Just one outpatient therapy
session can cost more than one hundred dollars, and
residential treatment facilities that provide twenty-four-houra-day, seven-day-a-week, mental health care can cost more
than $250,000 per year.292
Public mental health insurance coverage does not ensure
access to all types of mental health care delivery programs.293
Although State Child Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP)
plans do pay for mental health care, the care that is covered
is inpatient and outpatient care, not school-based and
residential care.294 And, although the Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program
mandates the provision of all necessary medical services
(including mental health services) to Medicaid-eligible
children, many of these children are not receiving the
screenings for which they are eligible.295 State budget cuts
also may continue to reduce access to mental health care.296
Over a recent ten-year period, expenditures for mental health
and substance abuse decreased relative to overall healthcare
expenditures by thirteen percent.297 State budget shortfalls
combined with skyrocketing medical costs may cause some
children from low-income families to lose their health care
coverage while other children may experience a reduction in
coverage.298

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00095.pdf.
290. BAZELON, supra note 281, at 2 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 292).
291. Id. at 2.
292. Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO-03-397, CHILD
WELFARE
AND
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
(2003),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03397.pdf).
293. Id. at 3.
294. Id. (citing Center on an Aging Society, supra note 289).
295. Id.
296. BAZELON, supra note 281, at 3 (citing Center on an Aging Society, supra
note 289).
297. NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 289, at 2.
298. BAZELON, supra note 281, at 3 (citing Center on an Aging Society, supra
note 289).
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The legal system provides little assistance to individuals
who cannot afford basic mental health care services and who
do not have health insurance. Americans generally do not
have a constitutional, statutory, or common law right to
voluntary, non-emergency mental health care. States do not
have a constitutional duty to provide voluntary mental health
care services for those within its borders,299 and the failure to
provide basic voluntary psychiatric care and treatment does
not “shock the conscience” as would be necessary to establish
a due process violation.300 Although Congress and many state
legislatures have enacted mental health patient bills of rights
that speak to mental health patients receiving the services
they require,301 these bills generally do not establish a private
cause of action that would support a patient’s claim for basic
mental health care services.302 Congress, through the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), requires Medicare-participating hospitals with
dedicated emergency departments to provide necessary
stabilizing treatment to individuals who request emergency
treatment; however, this requirement only applies when the
individual is determined to have an emergency medical or
psychiatric condition.303 A suicidal patient thus has a limited
right under EMTALA to emergency room treatment sufficient
to stabilize her current psychiatric emergency, but not to
basic mental health care services that may help prevent the
next psychiatric emergency. The lack of access to, and
funding for, basic mental health care contributes to
emergency, inpatient, and acute mental health care, contexts

299. See, e.g., Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 770 F. Supp. 43, 46-47
(D. Mass. 1991).
300. See, e.g., id. at 46 (“In essence, Plaintiff claims that the state failed to
provide him with adequate psychiatric care and treatment . . . these
shortcomings . . . are not so egregious as to shock the conscience . . . .” (quoting
Pittsley
v.
Warish,
927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted)).
301. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10841 (2001) (“It is the sense of the Congress that, .
. . each State should review and revise [its laws as] necessary to ensure that
mental health patients receive the protection and services they require . . . .”).
302. See, e.g., Monahan, 770 F. Supp. at 47 (“Congress did not intend to
create a private right of action [in 42 U.S.C. § 10841].”).
303. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (2006) (Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act stabilization requirement); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(ii) (2006)
(regulatory stabilization requirement).
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in which restraints and seclusion are used more frequently.304
Understaffing of facilities, caused by a lack of funding,
has been one of the most persistent barriers to appropriate
treatment, including appropriate use of restraint and
seclusion.305 Studies routinely show that increased staff-topatient ratios reduce the use of restraint and seclusion. A
2002 study, for example, found that increases in the number
of staff members relative to the number of patients receiving
care at a public psychiatric hospital were significantly related
to decreases in reliance on restraint and seclusion for
managing challenging behavioral problems.306
Although
federal and state laws prohibit the use of restraint and
seclusion to compensate for inadequate staffing, this mandate
is unfunded.
Stated another way, Congress and state
legislatures traditionally have not appropriated the funds to
ensure adequate staff-to-patient ratios as part of the same
legislation prohibiting the use of restraint and seclusion as a
substitute for adequate staffing.
B. The Conflict Between Patient Safety and Autonomy
Restraint and seclusion questions also implicate
competing goals of patient safety and autonomy.307 Today,
304. See, e.g., U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at ch. 2 (1999),
available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html
(lack of access to mental health care contributes to emergency and inpatient
health care).
305. See, e.g., Walter E. Barton, Hospital Services for the Mentally Ill, 286
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLITICAL & SOC. SCI. 107, 113 (1953) (“Hospitals have been
so preoccupied with problems of short staff and overcrowding that they have
had little time to develop programs for the early recognition, diagnosis,
treatment, and prevention of psychiatric disorders.”); Beverly Winkels,
Seclusion Rooms and Other Restraints, NURSING, Mar. 2004, at 12, 12 (“[I]f a
patient needs 1:1 care as a substitute for restraints, adequate staff isn’t always
available.”).
306. Dennis C. Donat, Impact of Improved Staffing on Seclusion/Restraint
Reliance in a Public Psychiatric Hospital, 25 PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. J. 413, 415
(2002) (“This confirmed that as the staff:patient ratio gradually increased, the
reliance on seclusion and restraint in this hospital gradually decreased.”).
307. See, e.g., Lorraine Cecilia Mion et al., Physical Restraint Use in the
Hospital Setting: Unresolved Issues and Directions for Research, 74 MILBANK Q.
411, 420 (1996) (“Clinicians typically focus on the ethical principles of
beneficence and nonmaleficence when caring for hospitalized patients, which
leads to a frequent medical moral dilemma: how to prevent harm to the patient
and simultaneously preserve the patient’s autonomy.” (citing Arthur Schafer,
Restraints and the Elderly: When Safety and Autonomy Conflict, 132 CAN. MED.
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hospitals admit psychiatric patients almost exclusively on
criteria designed to determine whether they are dangerous to
themselves or others.308 Although the current restraint and
seclusion rhetoric correctly considers the all-too-real dangers
of restraint and seclusion, the role of these interventions in
preventing violence and patient self-injury in psychiatric
emergencies also must be taken into account.
Common law requires institutional health care providers
to protect patients against harm from themselves and others.
In the long-term care context, the Texas Supreme Court
recently held that a nursing home is legally required to
prepare a comprehensive care plan for the medical and
mental needs of its patients, and clarified that this plan may
“require enhanced supervision and additional staff or physical
restraints to protect them from injuring themselves and
others or to protect them from other patients.”309 This case
builds on the common law principle that hospitals, including
hospitals treating patients with mental health conditions,
have a duty to prevent patients from harming themselves and
others, and that this duty may include the imposition of
restraints: “The hospital’s responsibility to its patient
extended to the taking of such measures as were necessary to

ASS’N
J.
2157
(1985),
available
at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1346330&blobtype=pdf)
); A. Sourander et al., Use of Holding, Restraints, Seclusion and Time-out in Child
and Adolescent Psychiatric In-Patient Treatment, 11 EUR. CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 162. 162 (2002) (“[T]he use of restraints . . . poses a conflict between a
patient’s clinical needs and legal rights.”); Thomas S. Szasz, Hospital Refusal to
Release a Mental Patient, 9 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 220, 220 (1960) (“The
double role of the institutional psychiatrist—consisting on the one hand of being
a therapist to his patient, and on the other of being a protector of society against
the patient—is one of the major dilemmas facing contemporary psychiatry.”);
Tardiff, supra note 132, at 614 (“In an age of concern about the rights and
freedom of the individual, the use of coercive measures of control in psychiatric
hospitals has come under intense scrutiny by the legal and medical
professions.”); Taxis, supra note 3, at 158 (“[N]urses [and other staff members]
are clearly responsible for the safety of patients, [but codes of ethics such as] the
American Nurses Association . . . also require[] that the nurse provide care that
is respectful of the dignity and individuality of each patient. . . . An ethical
quagmire often arises when the nurse, faced with a decision to restrain or
seclude a patient, must balance factors of autonomy, beneficence, and
nonmaleficence with therapeutic goals.” (citing BANDMAN & BANDMAN, supra
note 3; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3)).
308. Sharfstein, supra note 119, at 1.
309. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 850 (Tex.
2005).
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prevent the patient from hurting himself if the hospital knew
or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that
the patient’s mental incapacity might lead to his own
injury.”310
Many times, however, a health care provider’s common
law duty to prevent violent and assaultive patients from
harming themselves and others will conflict with the
provider’s ethical and legal duty to promote patient
autonomy. The word “autonomy” derives from the Greek
autos (“self”) and nomos (“rule,” “governance,” or “law”).311
Although the word autonomy traditionally referred to the
self-rule of independent city-states, bioethicists, lawyers, and
others since have extended the word to refer to the related
concepts of personal liberty, self-governance, and individual
choice.312 An autonomous individual self-rules and is free
from controlling interference by others.313 An individual who
has diminished autonomy, on the other hand, may be
controlled by others or may be incapable of deliberating about
or acting upon her personal desires and goals.314 Individuals
who are incarcerated in jails and individuals who have
intellectual disabilities that interfere with decision-making
capacity frequently are referred to as having diminished
autonomy.315
Physically and chemically restrained and
secluded patients who lack freedom of movement and the
ability to control their behavior also have diminished
autonomy.316
In situations in which a health care provider has
attempted to, but cannot, calm a violent patient using less
restrictive de-escalation techniques, and where the provider
reasonably believes that significant patient self-injury or
death, or injury to or the death of a third-party is imminent,
the health care provider may restrain or seclude the patient

310. Harris v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 557 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ.
App.-1st 1977).
311. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 57.
312. Id. at 57-58.
313. Id. at 58.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See id. (“Even autonomous persons with self-governing capacities
sometimes fail to govern themselves in particular choices because of temporary
restraints caused by illness or depression . . . or other conditions that restrict
their options.”).
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as a means of preventing violence.317 In these situations, the
intervention appears to be consistent with the provider’s
common law duty to prevent patients from injuring
themselves and others. By ordering the intervention, the
provider also, however, has diminished the autonomy of the
restrained or secluded patient.318
The question becomes how a provider’s common law duty
to prevent patient self-injury and harm to others should be
balanced with the duty to promote patient autonomy in a
psychiatric emergency. Those in favor of policies that would
eliminate the use of psychiatric restraint and seclusion weigh
the patient’s right to autonomy more heavily than the
provider’s duty to prevent patient self-injury and harm to
others.319 Indeed, the patient’s right to autonomy (to the
exclusion of patient and community safety) tends to be
featured prominently in the materials of many psychiatric
patient advocacy organizations: “Seclusion and restraint
procedures . . . represent a significant infringement of an
individual’s right to autonomy and self-determination . . . .”320
Positions such as these are not surprising considering the
high value our culture places on individual autonomy.321
Unfortunately, reductions in the use of restraint and
seclusion also have been associated with injury to or the
death of the violent patient, another patient, an employee, or
a third party.322 And this potential for injury or death cannot
be ignored. Recent studies show that approximately eighteen
to twenty-five percent of psychiatric inpatients exhibit violent
behavior while in the hospital.323 Approximately seventy-

317. Sharfstein, supra note 119, at 1 (“At times, it is necessary to restrain or
isolate individuals to prevent them from harming themselves or others.”).
318. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 58 (“Personal autonomy
is . . . self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from
limitations.”).
319. PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT ADVOCATE OFFICE, REVIEW OF SECLUSION AND
RESTRAINT PRACTICES IN ONTARIO PROVINCIAL PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS:
PERSPECTIVES OF PATIENTS, CLINICIANS, AND ADVOCATES 3 (2001).
320. Id.
321. See, e.g., DANIEL B. SINCLAIR, JEWISH BIOMEDICAL LAW: LEGAL AND
EXTRA-LEGAL DIMENSIONS 174 (2003) (“In modern common-law systems, the
concept of autonomy is at the centre of the physician-patient relationship, and
constitutes a value to which the courts attempt to give as full expression as
possible.”); Schafer, supra note 308, at 1258.
322. Note, supra note 64, at 156.
323. Michele Raja & Antonella Azzoni, Hostility and Violence of Acute
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eight percent of violent acts committed by psychiatric
inpatients are directed toward “nurses, with other targets
being (in descending order of frequency) fellow patients,
property, [the patient himself or herself], physicians,
psychologists, family members, and housekeeping staff.”324
“Ten to 45% of patients with schizophrenia exhibit aggressive
or
threatening
behavior
during
hospitalization.”325
Approximately ten percent of individuals diagnosed with
schizophrenia commit suicide,326 many during young
adulthood, and some of these young adults make suicide
attempts shortly before and even during psychiatric
admissions.327 Although physicians and other mental health
care providers sometimes can predict which threats will turn
to actual violence based on diagnosis, the patient’s current
behavior, the patient’s previous history, and the provider’s
previous experience with the patient, the unpredictability of
mental illness and its various manifestations prevents

Psychiatric Inpatients, 1 CLINICAL PRAC. & EPIDEMIOLOGY IN MENTAL HEALTH
1, 1 (2005) (citing C. Arango et al., Violence in In-Patients with Schizophrenia: A
Prospective Study, 25 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 493 (1999); McNeil et al.,
Predictors of Violence in Civilly Committed Acute Psychiatric Patients, 145 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 965 (1988)).
324. Id.; see also Richard A. Friedman, Violence and Mental Illness: How
Strong is the Link?, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2064, 2064 (2006) (discussing the
death of Wayne Fenton, associate director of the National Institute for Mental
Health, who was killed by a violent patient with schizophrenia on September 3,
2006).
325. Raja & Azzoni, supra note 324, at 1 (citing T. Craig, An Epidemiological
Study of Problems Associated with Violence Among Psychiatric Problems, 139
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1262 (1982); M. Rossi et al., Violent or Fear-Inducing
Behavior Associated with Hospital Admission, 36 HOSP. COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 643 (1985); K. Tardiff et al., Violence by Patients Admitted to a
Private Psychiatric, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 88 (1997); K. Tardiff & A. Sweillam,
Assault, Suicide, and Mental Illness, 37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 164
(1980)); see also Friedman, supra note 325, at 2065 (providing additional
statistics regarding assaultive patients).
326. Alan Breier, Introduction: A New Era in the Pharmacotherapy of
Psychotic Disorders, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 3, 3 (2001) (citing Alan Breier
& B.M. Astrachan, Characterization of Schizophrenic Patients Who Commit
Suicide, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 206 (1984)).
327. See, e.g., S. Cohen et al., Rates and Correlates of Suicide Attempts in
First-Admission Psychotic Patients, 90 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 167
(1994) (documenting patient suicide attempts during the episode for which they
were hospitalized); H. Spie l et al., Suicidal Behavior of Psychiatric In-Patients,
106 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 134 (2002) (examining suicidal behavior
before and during psychiatric inpatient stays).
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providers from accurately identifying all violent patients.328
I do not believe that ethical interpretations or laws that
would completely eliminate restraint and seclusion as an
option are supportable in this context. By “this context,” I
mean a situation in which: (1) all patients do not have access
to basic mental health care; (2) a lack of access to and funding
for such care contributes to the use of emergency, inpatient,
and acute mental health care; (3) a mental health care
provider working in this environment reasonably believes
that a psychiatric patient may seriously injure or kill him or
herself or another person; and (4) less restrictive deescalation measures have been tried and have proven
ineffective. Instead, the violent patient’s right to autonomy
must be balanced against the interest in maintaining the life
and safety of the patient and third parties. A policy that
would eliminate the use of restraint and seclusion as an
option in this context would focus too narrowly on the
question of whether the violent patient’s liberty interest has
been infringed. Instead, the question should be whether the
nature or extent of the liberty violation is reasonable in light
of the imminent threat to health or safety.329

328. Note, supra note 70, at 162.
329. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-24 (1982). In Youngberg,
the Court said:
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests in safety and
freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute . . . .
In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, there are occasions in
which it is necessary for the State to restrain the movement of
residents—for example, to protect them as well as others from violence.
. . . The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has been
infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of
absolute safety is such as to violate due process. . . . In determining
what is “reasonable”—in this and in any case presenting a claim for
training by a State—we emphasize that courts must show deference to
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional.
Id. at 319-20, 322. Since Youngberg, many courts have applied the professional
judgment standard to restraint and seclusion cases. See, e.g., Heidemann v.
Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1029-31 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff’s evidence was
“insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to whether the blanket wrapping
treatment represented a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards”); Subacz v. Sellars, No. CIV.A.96-CV-6411,
1998 WL 720822, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1998) (two physicians’ reports
could be a basis for finding that professional judgment was not exercised in the
use of bodily restraints); United States v. Pennsylvania, 902 F. Supp. 565, 63140 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (finding the institutional defendant had exercised
professional judgment in attempting to treat residents’ behavior problems).
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In light of the significant dangers of restraint and
seclusion, I think that the restraint and seclusion-free
movement has important and laudable goals. However,
lawmakers need to consider a more balanced and complete
dialogue regarding the root causes of violence and aggression
before adopting policies that would completely prohibit the
use of restraint and seclusion. Attempts to eliminate factors
within the mental health care system that contribute to
mental health conditions that manifest in violence and
aggression should precede, or at least accompany, attempts to
eliminate the use of restraint and seclusion.
C. A Note About Legalism Versus Medicalism
Before discussing my approach to the restraint and
seclusion controversy, I would like to suggest a final reason
for the persistence of the controversy, which relates to
legalism and medicalism. One theme in the psychiatry and
the law literature is legalism versus anti-legalism, or
medicalism. This theme views the reform of mental health
legislation and its history in terms of a pendulous movement
between the two extremes of stringent mental health
regulation, on the one hand, and unchecked medical
discretion on the other.330 The legalism versus medicalism
theme is a useful tool for exploring opposing attitudes
towards the use of restraint and seclusion.
The philosophical doctrine of legalism has been equated
with formalism (a mechanistic approach) that many believe is
too rigid to regulate the unpredictable field of psychiatry.331
According to the doctrine of legalism, moral conduct is “a
matter of rule following rather than individual conscience.”332
Legalism also suggests rigid adherence to the form of the law,
rather than its spirit or intended purpose.333 However
defined, one frequent criticism of legalism when applied to
the field of psychiatry is that psychiatric decision-making is
better left to professional ethics, not stringent regulation.
Legalism also has been blamed for attempting to limit
330. Phil Fennell, Law and Psychiatry: The Legal Constitution of the
Psychiatric System, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 35, 37-38 (1986).
331. Id. (citing K. Jones, The Limitations of the Legal Approach to Mental
Health, 3 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 10, 10-11 (1980)).
332. Id. at 38.
333. Id.
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medical discretion by enhancing patients’ rights.334
Anti-legalism, or medicalism, focuses on freeing of
Medicalism highly
psychiatry from excess regulation.335
values the independent medical judgment of psychiatrists and
other mental health professionals, and encourages
professionals to make decisions that will minimize harmful
physical effects.336
Proponents of medicalism value
compassion and a desire to protect patients from harm.337 As
expected, opponents view the medical model as paternalistic
and outdated.338
Viewed through the lens of legalism versus medicalism,
the controversy surrounding psychiatric restraint and
seclusion use is better understood.
The goal of many
psychiatric patient consumer advocates is to reduce the use of
restraint and seclusion because their use has caused
psychological harm, serious physical injury, and even
death.339 One option for meeting this goal is to establish, by
means of statute or regulation, the right of mental health
patients to be free from dangerous holds and psychologically
harmful isolation practices.340 Because of the difficulty of
distinguishing between safe and unsafe methods of restraint
and seclusion, as well as the administrative and judicial
oversight needed to determine which ordering physicians
were behaving carefully or dangerously vis-à-vis these
interventions, consumer advocates instead decide to support a
formal and absolute right of patients to be free from all
restraints and seclusion.341 Mental health care providers who
use alternative de-escalation strategies are viewed as
complying with the law, whereas providers who use restraint
and seclusion are viewed as violating human rights.
The goal of many mental health care professionals also is
to prevent psychological harm, physical injury, and death.
Mental health care professionals use their education and
clinical training to weigh factors such as diagnosis, current

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See id. at 39-40.
Id. at 37.
Schafer, supra note 308, at 1257.
Id.
See id.
See supra Parts III.B-C.
See supra Parts IV.B-C.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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behavior, and past experience with the patient to determine,
when all less restrictive measures have been tried and have
failed, whether to restrain or seclude the patient.342 Although
formal rules permitting or prohibiting restraint and seclusion
are nice, they are not altogether useful in balancing the
interests of the psychiatric patient and third parties when the
unpredictable behavior of a patient is at issue. A medicalist
might view the psychiatrist’s application of professional
judgment to the emergency situation as an act of compassion
and a desire to protect patients and third parties from harm;
a legalist, however, might interpret the decision to order
restraint or seclusion as controlling and demeaning.343
Although mental health consumer advocates and the
medical profession both have patient health as their goal,
they differ regarding the best means of accomplishing it. The
momentum of the current non-restraint movement shows the
value our culture places on autonomy and reminds us of our
mandate to respect and promote the rights of individuals with
disabilities, including individuals with mental illness.344 But
I worry that the realities of our mental health care system
(including a lack of access to basic mental health care, which
contributes to the need for emergency, inpatient, and acute
mental health care, the necessity of which is determined
based on criteria including the dangerousness of the patient
to self and others) have not yet caught up with the goals of
the non-restraint movement. When a physician or other
licensed independent practitioner reasonably believes that a
patient’s behavior poses an imminent threat to the life or
health of the patient or a third party and all less restrictive
measures have proven ineffective, the option to use restraint
or seclusion should be preserved.
D. Future Restraint and Seclusion Policy
Existing federal and state laws governing psychiatric
restraint and seclusion regulate the individuals who can
order restraint and seclusion, the length of time for which
restraint and seclusion may be ordered, the criteria for the
imposition of restraint and seclusion, the use of restraint and

342. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
343. Schafer, supra note 308, at 1257.
344. See supra Part V.B.
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seclusion to compensate for inadequate staffing, the
education of health care professionals regarding the dangers
of restraint and seclusion, and the reporting of adverse events
that occur during or as a result of these interventions.345 So,
what should be the direction of future restraint and seclusion
policy?
Our health care policy must address the root causes of
the use of restraint and seclusion. The studies discussed in
Part V.A suggest that we can reduce the incidence of the
violent and aggressive behavior that traditionally has
preceded the use of restraint and seclusion by providing
earlier intervention and care for individuals with mental
illness. The studies discussed in Part V.B further suggest
that higher staff-to-patient ratios can reduce the use of
restraint and seclusion.346 Additional studies suggest that
more detailed patient assessments at the time of admission
may increase health care providers’ ability to identify those
patients who may resort to violence and those who will not,
thus reducing unnecessary use of restraint and seclusion.347
Of course, earlier intervention and care for individuals with
mental illness, higher staff to patient ratios, and more
detailed violence screening require more time and human
resources and greater funding of mental health care. In a
perfect world with limitless funds, our health care policy
would appropriate more funds for basic mental health care,
increased staffing of emergency and inpatient mental health
care, and more detailed inpatient assessments. Such a policy
would prospectively minimize the factors that actually give
rise to psychiatric violence and aggression, instead of
responding to violence and aggression that already has
occurred or is about to occur.
In an imperfect world in which additional funding for
basic mental health care and increased staffing of emergency
and inpatient psychiatric units is not forthcoming, our health
care policy should continue to require the use of alternative

345. See supra Parts III.B-C.
346. Donat, supra note 307, at 415 (“This confirmed that as the staff:patient
ratio gradually increased, the reliance on seclusion and restraint in this
hospital gradually decreased.”).
347. See, e.g., Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Screening for Risk of
Inpatient Violence: Validation of an Actuarial Tool, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579,
580 (1994).
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de-escalation strategies if the benefits of these strategies
outweigh the physical and psychological risks to the patient
and third parties from restraint and seclusion. Laws and
regulations should continue to require health care providers
to incorporate the least restrictive techniques into their deescalation strategies, thereby limiting the use of restraint and
seclusion to extreme situations involving imminent violence
that are unresponsive to alternative de-escalation strategies.
In these extreme situations, our laws and regulations should
continue to permit the use of restraint and seclusion on the
grounds that the life of the patient and third parties
outweighs the liberty interference and physical and
psychological injuries that may result from restraint and
seclusion use.
Our current laws do not, however, provide specific
guidance regarding safe methods of restraint and seclusion.
For example, the Conditions of Participation require
Medicare-participating hospitals to implement restraint and
seclusion in the least restrictive manner possible and in
accordance with safe appropriate restraining techniques.348
However, neither the Conditions of Participation nor any
guidance adopted thereunder specify the relative safety of
various methods of restraint and seclusion. To ensure that
health care providers are using only the safest methods of
restraint and seclusion, a Congressional committee, a federal
agency or subagency such as SAMHSA, or the Government
Accountability Office could research, identify, and publish as
guidance the safest methods of restraint and seclusion.
Depending on the research findings, the guidance may, for
example, prohibit health care providers from administering
restraints (identified in the guidance by name and picture)
that obstruct a patient’s airway, impair a patient’s breathing,
or interfere with a patient’s ability to communicate. The
guidance may permit health care providers to use prone and
supine holds only as a transition to another hold and only
when an observer who has been trained to identify the risks
associated with positional, compression, or restraint
asphyxiation and with prone and supine holds, and who is not
involved in the restraint, is ensuring that the patient’s

348. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(f) (2007).
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breathing is not impaired.349
Although many laws, including the COPs, establish
maximum time limits for which restraint and seclusion may
be imposed, and require the continual assessment,
monitoring, and reevaluation of restrained or secluded
patients,350 neither the COPs nor any guidance adopted
thereunder specify exactly how restrained or secluded
patients should be monitored. Because JCAHO data shows
that one of the most significant risks to individuals who are
restrained is suffocation, our health care policy should
consider requiring the use of pulse oximetry during episodes
of restraint.351
Pulse oximetry is a noninvasive direct
measure of the oxygen saturation of hemoglobin.352 Modern,
portable oximeters are considered accurate and reliable.353
More importantly, recent studies conclude that oximetry may
be a “viable, cost-effective tool that could protect persons who
are subjected to physical restraint from respiratory
embarrassment, suffocation, and death”354 by alerting health
care professionals to situations in which an individual’s
oxygen is dangerously low.
Although many laws, including the COPs, permit
restraint or seclusion to be used only when “less restrictive
measures have been found to be ineffective to protect the
patients or others from harm,”355 and require all staff who
have direct patient contact to have ongoing education and
training in “alternative methods for handling behavior,
symptoms, and situations that traditionally have been
treated through the use of restraints or seclusion,”356 neither
the COPs nor any guidance adopted thereunder specify the
least restrictive alternatives to restraint and seclusion nor do
they rate the relative effectiveness of alternative, named de-

349. Recent Texas legislation may be helpful in this regard. See TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 322.052 (Vernon 2006).
350. 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(f)(3)(ii)(D), (f)(5).
351. See, e.g., Masters, supra note 120, at 18; Kim James Masters & Deborah
Wandless, Use of Pulse Oximetry During Restraint Episodes, 56 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 1313, 1313 (2005).
352. Masters & Wandless, supra note 352, at 1313.
353. Id. (citing R.R. Reeves & M.E. Ladner, Screening for Decreased Oxygen
Saturation During Medical Evaluations, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 108 (2005)).
354. Masters & Wandless, supra note 352, at 1313.
355. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(f)(3)(i).
356. Id. § 482.13(f)(6).
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escalation strategies. Federal and state legislatures and
administrative agencies may wish to take notice of the
existence of alternative distraction aids, including virtual
reality techniques, that are being considered by behavioral
psychologists who study the effectiveness of de-escalation
strategies.357 Given JCAHO’s finding that seclusion is twenty
times safer than restraint, lawmakers also may wish to
consider the effectiveness of prioritizing seclusion in the
intervention sequence.358
Finally, the survivor studies discussed in Part III show
that even “safe” restraint and seclusion practices can cause
psychological harm. Additional literature written by patients
who have been restrained or secluded further detail the
liberty interferences and negative psychological effects,
including embarrassment, humiliation, and dehumanization,
that can result from the use of restraint and seclusion.359
Even though our laws permit the use of restraint and
seclusion on the grounds that these interventions may save
the life of the patient or third parties in a psychiatric
emergency that is non-responsive to alternative de-escalation
strategies, our mental health care providers should recognize
the significant liberty interference and the potential for
negative psychological effects and incorporate measures to
counteract these injuries into the patient’s treatment plan.
The impact of restraint and seclusion on psychiatric patients
should be “acknowledged and addressed therapeutically.”360
For centuries, restraint and seclusion have been overused
as
methods
of
psychiatric
behavior
management.

357. See, e.g., Masters, supra note 120, at 19.
358. See id. at 20.
359. STEPHANIE HAIMOWITZ ET AL., RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION – A RISK
MANAGEMENT
GUIDE
11
(Sept.
2006),
available
at
http://www.power2u.org/downloads/RS%20Risk%20Manag%20Guide%20Oct%2006.pdf (noting that restraint and
seclusion can be humiliating); OHIO LEGAL RIGHTS SERV., A CLOSER LOOK:
SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT PRACTICES IN CHILDREN’S RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES
OHIO
(Apr.
2002),
available
at
IN
http://www.olrs.ohio.gov/asp/pub_3_PhysicalRestraint.asp (noting that it is
embarrassing to be restrained and secluded); Lisa W. Foderaro, Hospitals Seek
an Alternative to Straitjacket, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at A1 (noting that
physical restraints can be dehumanizing).
360. OVERCOMING BARRIERS, supra note 182 (“The impact of abuse and
trauma on the lives of consumers and staff must be acknowledged and
addressed therapeutically.”).
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Acknowledgement of both the physical and psychological
dangers of restraint and seclusion as well as the realities of
our modern mental health care system may take us to the
next step in the restraint and seclusion controversy.

